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UNIFORM ARBITRA TION A CT
In 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed the Uniform Arbitration Act (U.A.A.).' Since that time,
approximately half of the states have enacted statutes modeled after it.2
Arbitration today is becoming more and more popular as a form of dispute
resolution, and thousands of cases are decided by arbitrators every year
under the U.A.A.' This survey is intended to collect and present recent
decisions as a general guide to various problems that arise under the U.A.A.
I. VARIATIONS ON THE U.A.A.
The provisions of the U.A.A., while similar in most of the adopting
jurisdictions, are not identical. There are variations in subject matter cov-
erage and procedures. In late 1980, both Missouri and Pennsylvania
adopted statutes that generally conform to the U.A.A. but contain varia-
tions that alter its scope and application.4
1. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT §§ 1-25 (1955), 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as U.A.A.].
2. Jurisdictions that have adopted the U.A.A. include Alaska, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
3. There are several reasons for the popularity of arbitration over normal judi-
cial remedies, as a president of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) points
out:
Business firms prefer to have their disagreements decided by people who
are experts. Arbitrators, unlike judges, can be chosen for their business
experience. AAA panels include engineers, business consultants, and
many other specialized experts, as well as attorneys.
The simplicity of arbitration is also an inducement. No company
wants to have its funds tied up for long periods. The arbitration process
can move promptly, which is especially important in disputes between
builders and contractors over performance payments or between business
partners who cannot agree about the division of assets.
Arbitration takes place in a private, informal atmosphere, one where
business people feel comfortable. And there is less chance that trade
secrets will be disclosed to competitors or that a firm's reputation will be
placed iti jeopardy. In arbitration, confidentiality is honored.
Because the award is not subject to appeal, the arbitration process
results in a final and binding decision. Many parties prefer that finality,
rather than facing the prospect of extended appellate litigation. Again,
most Americans want to stay out of court.
R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNow 7 (1980).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (Cum. Supp. 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
3
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A. Missouri
In August 1980, Missouri's version of the U.A.A. became effective.5
The language of the Missouri statute closely follows that of the uniform act,
differing in only three aspects. The Missouri act (1) requires a boldface
notice provision in the contract for an arbitration agreement to be enforcea-
ble,6 (2) restricts the application of the statute,7 and (3) fails to expressly
repeal prior Missouri law that is inconsistent with the new statute.8
An arbitration agreement is a voluntary agreement between two par-
ties to a contract, who agree to forego the use of the judiciary to resolve
disputes that may arise in the future.9 In adopting the new statute, the
Missouri legislature was apparently concerned with protecting the voli-
tional nature of arbitration agreements by requiring a boldface statement,
above or adjacent to the space provided for signatures, which reads, "THIS
CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION
WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES."' 0 Without this
statement, an arbitration agreement subject to the provisions of the statute
will not be enforced.' There is no similar provision in the U.A.A.
Section 435.350 of the Missouri act' 2 limits the types of contracts sub-
ject to the statute. The U.A.A. has no corresponding provision. Contracts
containing arbitration agreements generally are valid and enforceable in
Missouri, "except contracts of insurance and contracts of adhesion," but
this exception does not include contracts that warrant against defects in
construction. 3 The policy behind the exception appears to be similar to
that behind the section 435.460 notice provision-protecting the volitional
nature of arbitration agreements. ' 4 Adhesion contracts and insurance con-
tracts are similar in that both are form contracts with standardized
clauses.' 5 In both, the consumer has little or no choice due to the standard-
ized terms offered by all competitors. This lack of consumer choice negates
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.445 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
6. Id § 435.460.
7. Id § 435.350.
8. See Cronan, Missouri's New Arbitration Law--More Than Was Bargained For?,
38 J. Mo. B. 258, 260 (1982).
9. See M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 1.01 (1968).
10. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.460 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
11. Id
12. Id § 435.350.
13. Id
14. Comment, The Uniform Arbitration Act in Missouri, 46 Mo. L. REv. 627, 636
(1981).
15. "The process of entering into a contract of adhesion . . . 'is not one of
haggle or cooperative process but rather of fly and flypaper.'" J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.4 (1977) (quoting Leff, Contract as a Thing,
19 AM. U.L. REv. 131, 143 (1970)).
[Vol. 48
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the voluntary nature of arbitration agreements.16
Section 435.46517 provides that the statute applies only to "written
agreements between commercial persons, or between such persons and
those with whom they contract other than commercial persons," involving
the submission of an existing controversy between the parties, or one arising
thereafter, to arbitration. "Commercial persons" are "all persons and legal
entities, excluding any government or governmental subdivision or
agency."' 8 The Missouri statute does not contain the last sentence of sec-
tion I of the U.A.A.: "This act also applies to arbitration agreements be-
tween employers and employees or between their respective representatives
)219
On its face, the statute appears to exclude governmental units from
coverage.2) But the statute applies to written contracts between commercial
persons "and those with whom they contract other than commercial per-
sons." 2 1 Since "commercial persons" is a catch-all category, excluding only
governmental units, the statute specifically applies when only one party is a
governmental unit. Thus it only excludes agreements when both parties are
governmental units.2 2 It is unclear whether the statute applies to employ-
ment contracts containing arbitration agreements between individual em-
ployees and governmental units.23  The Missouri statute does not
specifically exclude such agreements, and a strong argument can be made
that it applies to the extent that these agreements are not preempted by or
inconsistent with state or federal law.24
The Missouri statute is also limited by section 435.445 to agreements
made after the effective date of the act, August 13, 1980.25 Unlike the
U.A.A., 26 the Missouri statute contains no provision repealing the prior ar-
bitration laws contained in sections 435.010 to 435.280,27 although several
provisions are inconsistent with the new statute.21 Section 435.010, for ex-
ample, provides that an arbitration agreement is not a bar to suit,29 while
the new statute provides that arbitration agreements are valid and enforce-
able and that any judicial action shall be stayed if an order or an applica-
16. Comment, supra note 14, at 636.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.465 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
18. Id
19. U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
20. Cronan, supra note 8, at 262.
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.465 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
22. Cronan, supra note 8, at 262.
23. Id
24. Comment, supra note 14, at 629.
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.445 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
26. See U.A.A. § 24 (1955).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 435.010-.280 (1978).
28. Comment, supra note 14, at 628.
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (1978).
1983)
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tion for arbitration has been entered or made.3 ' In addition, section
435.350 of the new statute states that it applies to written agreements to
submit existing controversies or those arising thereafter to arbitration,
3
'
while section 435.020 of the old statute only applies to existing controver-
sies. 2 If conflicts between the two statutes arise, the Missouri courts may
find an implied repeal of the old law.
33
B. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's new arbitration statute3 4 became effective on Decem-
ber 4, 1980. While Missouri's new arbitration statute generally conforms to
the U.A.A., Pennsylvania's is very different. In fact, one commentator has
noted over one hundred differences between the Pennsylvania statute and
the U.A.A.3 5 Most are minor, but others result in significant changes in the
scope and application of the statute.
Twelve of the twenty sections in the Pennsylvania statute contain only
minor wording changes, apparently for clarification.3 6 For example, head-
ings for each sub-paragraph have been added where none existed in the
U.A.A. In other cases, some words are deleted and others added to make
the statute more organized and easier to read.3
Six subsections of the Pennsylvania statute contain substantive varia-
tions.3 Section 7307(a)(1) provides that notice of the hearing must be
served on all parties at least ten days before the hearing, 9 while section 5 of
the U.A.A. requires only five days' notice.40 Section 7309(c),4 unlike sec-
tion 7 of the U.A.A.,4 2 expressly gives arbitrators the power to administer
oaths. Section 7311(b) allows a party only ten days after delivery of the
award to apply for a change of award,43 as contrasted with the twenty days
allowed by section 9 of the U.A.A.44 Section 7314(a) omits the language of
section 12(a) of the U.A.A. that provides for an award to be vacated if pro-
30. Id § 435.355 (Gum. Supp. 1982); Cronan, supra note 8, at 260.
31. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.350 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
32. Id § 435.020 (1978).
33. Cronan, supra note 8, at 260.
34. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
35. Sherman, Analysis of Penrsv/uani'a'- Arbiration Acl of 1980, 43 U. PIrr. L.
REV. 363, 368 (1982).
36. Id
37. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301, 7304, 7305, 7306, 7308, 7310, 7312,
7313, 7316, 7318, 7319, 7320 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
38. Sherman, supra note 35, at 369.
39. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7307 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
40. U.A.A. § 5 (1955).
41. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7309 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
42. U.A.A. § 7 (1955).
43. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7311 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
44. U.A.A. § 9 (1955).
[Vol. 48
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cured by fraud, corruption, or other undue means. 45  Section 7214(b)
changes the time limit for an application to vacate an award to thirty days
from the ninety days under the U.A.A. 46 Section 7315(a) changes from
ninety to thirty days the time to apply for modification or correction of an
award by the court. 47 Finally, section 7317 provides that an application to
the court shall be by petition rather than by motion as provided in section
16 of the U.A.A. 48
While the U.A.A. has twenty-five sections, Pennsylvania's statute has
twenty. Pennsylvania omitted section 15 of the U.A.A., concerning judg-
ment roll and docketing, apparently because the legislature deemed it un-
necessary.49 Section 20 of the U.A.A., which provides that the act will not
be applied retroactively, 50 was omitted; another provision not contained in
the arbitration statute itself gives the Pennsylvania statute retroactive effect
in some circumstances.5 Section 21 of the U.A.A., dealing with uniformity
of interpretation, was omitted,5 2 apparently because of the many differences
between the Pennsylvania statute and the uniform act.53 Section 22 of the
U.A.A., dealing with the constitutionality and severability of provisions,54
was omitted because the issue is already covered by Pennsylvania's Statu-
tory Construction Act.55 Section 24 of the U.A.A., repealing prior inconsis-
tent legislation, 56 was also omitted although many Pennsylvania provisions
are inconsistent with the new statute.5 7 Finally, section 25 of the U.A.A.,
dealing with its effective date,5 8 was omitted.
While most of Pennsylvania's variations are relatively minor, section
7302,5 9 dealing with the scope of the statute, differs significantly from the
U.A.A. Section 7302 takes the place of the last sentence of section 1 of the
U.A.A., which states that the act "applies to arbitration agreements be-
tween employers and employees or between their respective representa-
45. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981); U.A.A. § 12(a)
(1955).
46. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981); U.A.A. § 12(b)
(1955).
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7315 (Purdon Supp. 1981); U.A.A. § 13 (1955).
48. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7317 (Purdon Supp. 1981); U.A.A. § 16 (1955).
49. U.A.A. § 15 (1955); Sherman, supra note 35, at 370.
50. U.A.A. § 20 (1955).
51. Sherman, supra note 35, at 370. See Act of Oct. 5, 1980, P.L. No. 693,
§ 501(c), 1980 Pa. Laws 86.
52. U.A.A. § 21 (1955).
53. Sherman, supra note 35, at 371.
54. U.A.A. § 22 (1955).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 20051 (Purdon Pamphlet 1981). See Sherman,
supra note 35, at 372.
56. U.A.A. § 24 (1955).
57. Sherman, supra note 35, at 372.
58. U.A.A. § 25 (1955).
59. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
1983]
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tives. ' ° Section 7302(b) states that the statute shall apply to collective
bargaining arbitration agreements only where the statute is consistent with
any other statute regulating labor-management relations.6 Most collective
bargaining arbitration agreements in the private sector are governed by the
Taft-Hartley Act,62 and the state courts must apply federal labor law.6 3 It
is unclear whether Pennsylvania cases not governed by the Taft-Hartley
Act are governed by the new statute.
64
Section 7302(d)(2)65 allows a court to modify or correct an award
where the award is such that a court could have entered a judgment n.o.v.
This provision, however, is in direct conflict with the standards of review
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Tril-
og, 6 6 which state that courts should not review the merits of an arbitration
award.67 The Court felt that the federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitration would be undermined if state or federal courts were allowed to
review the merits of an award.'
When a private person is a party to an arbitration agreement, section
7302(a) states that the agreement must expressly provide in writing that the
statute shall apply.69 Section 7302(c) states that the same rule applies to
written contracts to which a governmental unit is a party.70 There is an
exception, however, when the "commonwealth government" is a party to
an arbitration agreement, in which case the statute governs even without an
express statement to that effect in the arbitration agreement. 7 1 "Common-
wealth government" is defined in the Pennsylvania Judicial Code as a sub-
division of a governmental unit; it includes courts and other officers and
agencies but excludes political subdivisions. 72 It seems, therefore, that the
general rule of section 7302(a) applies to arbitration agreements to which
political subdivisions are parties. But since Pennsylvania's Public Em-
ployee Relations Act,73 which governs such agreements, is inconsistent with
provisions of the new statute, an argument can be made that the statute
60. U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
61. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
63. Sherman, supra note 35, at 377.
64. Id at 378.
65. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
66. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
67. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585
(1960).
68. Id at 582.
69. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
70. Id § 7302(c).
71. Id
72. Id § 102. See also Sherman, supra note 35, at 383.
73. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
[Vol. 48
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should not apply to agreements where a political subdivision is a party. 74 It
seems clear that Pennsylvania's new statute will apply to arbitration in
commercial and other non-labor agreements. It remains to be seen whether
it will apply to collective bargaining agreements to which a political subdi-
vision is a party.
C. Arkansas
Arkansas also recently adopted the U.A.A., amending its prior arbitra-
tion statute in 1981 to include the basic provisions of the uniform act.7 5
With minor exceptions, the statute is identical to the U.A.A. The most
significant change is found in section 34-511, which corresponds to section 1
of the U.A.A. and provides that the act "shall have no application to per-
sonal injury or tort matters, employer-employee disputes, nor to any insured
or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract." 76 Arkansas,
like Pennsylvania, omitted section 22 of the U.A.A., which deals with the
constitutionality and severability of the statute.7 7
D. Arizona
Arizona's recently adopted arbitration statute also basically conforms
to the U.A.A.78 Section 12-1502 omits the last sentence of section 1 of the
U.A.A., which states that it "also applies to arbitration agreements between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives."
79
This sentence has been replaced by section 12-1517, which "has no applica-
tion to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or their
respective representatives." ' Sections 12-1511 and 12-1512 differ slightly
from sections 11 and 12 of the U.A.A., which deal with confirming and
vacating awards. Section 12-1511 explains how to apply for confirmation of
the award-a provision the U.A.A. lacks-and says that opposition to such
an application must be filed within twenty days8 1 as opposed to ninety days
under the U.A.A.12 Section 12-1516 incorporates and greatly simplifies sec-
tions 17 and 18 of the U.A.A., which deal with the proper court, jurisdic-
tion, and venue for arbitration agreements.8 3 The most significant change
is found in section 12-1518,84 which formerly provided for discretionary use
74. See Sherman, supra note 35, at 386.
75. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-511 to -532 (Gum. Supp. 1982). The statute
was amended on April 13, 1982, to include commercial disputes within its coverage.
76. Id § 34-511. See U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
77. See U.A.A. § 22 (1955); Sherman, supra note 35, at 372.
78. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1982).
79. U.A.A. § 1 (1955). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (1982).
80. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (1982).
81. Id § 12-1511.
82. U.A.A. § 12 (1955).
83. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1516 (1982); U.A.A. §§ 17, 18 (1955).
84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1518 (1982).
1983]
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of arbitration agreements in certain state government contracts.8 5 It was
amended in 1982 to include two sections that provide for mandatory use of
arbitration agreements in certain situations.8 6 Section 12-1518(B) 7 re-
quires the use of arbitration agreements in all contracts that fall under sec-
tion 12-133,88 dealing with arbitration of claims in Arizona superior courts.
Section 12-1518(C) mandates the use of arbitration agreements by the state
government in all public works contracts if the amount in controversy is less
than $100,000.89 There are no comparable provisions in the U.A.A.
II. VALIDITY OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The U.A.A. provides that a written agreement to submit any present
or future controversy to arbitration "is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."9 In adopting the U.A.A., state legislatures have tempered the
enthusiasm of this provision. For example, Texas and South Carolina pro-
hibit arbitration of workers' compensation claims.9" Three states require
prominent notice of an arbitration clause's binding effect. 92 Several states
forbid arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, 93 and many jurisdic-
tions restrict arbitration agreements between employers and employees.9 4
85. See id (1979) (amended 1982). Such agreements had to be made at the
time of entering into the contract or by subsequent written mutual agreement if
prior to the filing of a civil action.
86. Id § 12-1518 (1982).
87. .d § 12-1518(B).
88. Id § 12-133.
89. Id § 12-1518(C).
90. U.A.A. § 1 (1955) provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any contro-
versy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrev-
ocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives [un-
less otherwise provided in the agreement].
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1982); TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224(c) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Cum. Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-
10(a) (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1982); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224-1
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Cum. Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401
(1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (Cum. Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 802A (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
94. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Cum. Supp.
1982); IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1975); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(3) (West 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(b)(2) (Supp.
1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 802A (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
[Vol. 48
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In addition to these statutory idiosyncracies, state courts have em-
ployed a variety of policies and preferences in their interpretations of the
U.A.A. A survey of recent decisions suggests five considerations affecting
the validity of an arbitration agreement: (1) the statute may be narrowly
construed to avoid statutory exceptions; (2) the terms of the contract and
the conditions surrounding its execution may dictate whether or not a pro-
vision is enforceable; (3) one party may be a member of a class that is not
included in the statute or which requires special rules; (4) the state may
have other public policies outside of the arbitration statute which restrict
the ability to use an arbitration clause; and (5) particular state provisions
may be superceded in interstate commerce by the Federal Arbitration Act.
A. Narrow Construction of the Statute
The U.A.A.'s provisions are normally construed broadly. Arbitration
is looked upon with favor, and arbitration agreements generally are liber-
ally construed with any doubts resolved in favor of arbitration.
95
In National Camera, Inc. v. Love, 96 the Colorado Court of Appeals consid-
ered the meaning of the U.A.A.'s exception to the general validity of arbi-
tration agreements: they are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."9 7 The court held
that a claim of fraud in the inducement to the underlying contract was not
grounds for avoiding compulsory arbitration. Rather, it said, only fraud in
inducing assent to the arbitration provision itself warrants revocation.9
8
The court, in keeping with the general policy favoring broad construction,
construed the U.A.A.'s exception to arbitrability as narrowly as possible.
B. Terms of the Contract
A second category of cases concerning the validity of agreements in-
volves the analysis of contractual language and relationships. It is apparent
from a survey of the cases that the ordinary rules of contract interpretation
are generally used in deciding on the validity of a particular provision.
99
95. See, e.g., University of Alaska v. Modern Construction, Inc., 522 P.2d 1132,
1138 (Alaska 1974); New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v. Lake Patagonia Recreation
Ass'n, 12 Ariz. App. 13, 16, 467 P.2d 88, 91 (1970); Pettinaro Construction Co. v.
Harry C. Patridge, Jr. & Sons, 408 A.2d 957, 961-62 (Del. Ch. 1979); McCandliss v.
Ward W. Ross, Inc., 45 Mich. App. 342, 345, 206 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1973); Exber,
Inc. v. Statten Construction Co., 92 Nev. 721, 726, 558 P.2d 517, 522 (1976). But see
Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41111. 2d 91, 94, 242 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1968) (favor-
ing narrow construction of arbitration agreements).
96. 644 P.2d 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-203 (Supp. 1981); U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
98. 644 P.2d at 95. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
come to the same conclusion in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
99. See Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 358, 363, 232 N.E.2d 32,
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In State ex rel Skinner v. Lombard Co. , the Illinois Appellate Court re-
solved an apparent conflict in a construction contract between an arbitra-
tion clause and a reservation of remedies provision. The arbitration section
provided that the "agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable
under the prevailing arbitration law," while the remedies provision stated
that "the rights and remedies available [under this contract] shall be in
addition to and not a limitation of any duties, obligations, rights and reme-
dies otherwise imposed or available by law."' 1 The court held that the
arbitration clause took precedence because of its explicit unequivocal
language.'
0 2
In Skinner, the petitioner raised an additional claim that the right to
compel arbitration terminated upon completion of the work. The peti-
tioner relied on a subsection of the arbitration agreement that stated, "The
contractor shall carry on the Work and maintain the progress schedule dur-
ing any arbitration proceedings."'10 3 The court rejected this interpretation,
finding that the provision was consistent with an intent to arbitrate disputes
arising after completion.
10 4
InJaa v. Shacket,' °5 the Michigan Court of Appeals enforced an unu-
sual agreement in accord with the manifest intent of the parties. InJaa,
feuding partners executed an arbitration agreement after one partner filed
a lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The agreement gave the sole
arbitrator all powers of a Michigan circuit judge and directed him to follow
the substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law of Michigan.' 0 6 Another
clause provided for expanded appellate review of the arbitrator's findings of
fact and conclusions of law.'0 7 The court honored the agreement as
drafted, with one exception. It refused to review the arbitrator's findings of
fact, explaining that a private agreement affects only the powers of the arbi-
trator, not those of a court of law."0 8 Because the arbitrator was con-
strained to apply Michigan law, his conclusions of law were reviewable.
The arbitrator's findings of fact, like those of a circuit judge, were treated as
final unless clearly erroneous. To hold otherwise, said the court, would re-
sult in an impermissible expansion of the appellate court's power.'
0 9
34-35, rev'd, 41 Ill. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 149 (1968); Westbrook School Comm. v. West-
brook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 204, 207 (Me. 1979).
100. 106 Ill. App. 3d 307, 436 N.E,2d 566 (1982).
101. Id at - 436 N.E.2d at 567.
102. Id at - 436 N.E.2d at 568.
103. Id
104. Id
105. 114 Mich. App. 626, 319 N.W.2d 604 (1982).
106. Ia at 633, 319 N.W.2d at 606.
107. Id at 634, 319 N.W.2d at 607.
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Kessler, Merci & Lochner, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. 110 also involved
analysis of contract terms but focused on the relationship of the parties
rather than the language of the agreement. The issue was whether four
beneficiaries of a land trust were bound by the arbitration agreement in an
architectural services contract executed by their trustee.1"' One of the ben-
eficiaries had negotiated the contract. Three of the four had directed the
trustee to sign it. The trustee stated in the contract that all representations
were those of the beneficiaries only. i1 2 The respondent brought an action
against the trustee and the beneficiaries to compel arbitration. The Illinois
Appellate Court held that the beneficiaries had exercised sufficient control
to make the trustee their agent and were bound by the arbitration clause."
3
In parallel litigation, the court also compelled arbitration of the benefi-
ciaries' counterclaim against the respondent. The court pointed out that
"third-party beneficiaries of a contract have no greater rights than the
party they wish to claim under."1 1 4
In Southern Spindle & Flyer Co. v. Milliken & Co. ,1 15 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals considered whether an arbitration agreement existed be-
tween parties who had an oral contract under which the plaintiff was to
provide rigging, loading, and transportation services to the defendant. Af-
ter the plaintiff had substantially performed its services, it received an unso-
licited purchase order from the defendant. The plaintiff acknowledged
receipt of the document by letter and returned it to the defendant. The
plaintiff's president testified that he did not intend to agree to any of the
conditions in the purchase order. 16 When sued for unpaid services, the
defendant moved to stay the action and compel arbitration, arguing that a
clause in the purchase order required arbitration.1 7 The plaintiff replied
that it had never agreed to the terms of the purchase order. The court held
that there was no agreement to arbitrate. It noted that "general contract
law governs the issue of the existence" of an arbitration agreement and that
"mere acknowledgement of receipt of the purchase order form did not con-
stitute assent to its terms." 118
110. 101 Ill. App. 3d 502, 428 N.E.2d 608 (1981).
111. Id at 503, 428 N.E.2d at 609.
112. Id at 504, 428 N.E.2d at 610.
113. Id at 506, 428 N.E.2d at 611.
114. Id at 508, 428 N.E.2d at 613.
115. 53 N.C. App. 785, 281 S.E.2d 734 (1981).
116. Id at 787, 281 S.E.2d at 736.
117. Id The clause required any controversy regarding the contract to be settled
by arbitration. The agreement was within the ambit of North Carolina's arbitra-
tion statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567 (Supp. 1979).
118. 53 N.C. App. at 788, 281 S.E.2d at 736. In finding that a contract did not
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C. Protected Classes
The third consideration affecting the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment is whether one of the parties is a member of a protected class against
whom the agreement is not enforceable. While the majority of these classes
are specifically recognized in the various states' versions of the U.A.A.," t9
some have been identified only by the courts.'
20
1. Medical Patients
One such class may consist of medical patients who have agreed to
submit malpractice claims to arbitration. 2 ' Various panels of the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals have disagreed on the constitutionality of the Michi-
gan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act. 22 InJackson v. Detroit Memorial
Hospital,123 the court held that the Act violated the patient-plaintiff's right
to a fair and impartial hearing by requiring that at least one member of the
arbitration panel be a physician or hospital administrator.'24 A contrary
decision was rendered in Cushman v. Frankel,125 where the court expressed
concern regarding the composition of the arbitration panel but deferred to
the legislature and approved the provision.'
26
A third appellate panel never reached the due process issue. In Moore v.
Fragatos,'2 7 the court found that the patient did not waive his constitutional
right of access to the courts by signing the arbitration agreement.' 28 The
petitioner had signed the agreement when he was admitted to the hospital
for surgery. The court held that the petitioner's assent to that provision was
not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his fundamental right to
court access. 129 The court reasoned that if a criminal defendant must
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights,
then "honest, law-abiding citizens should . . . be entitled to similar
protections. 'o
In its decision, the Moore panel stressed the fragile psychological condi-
tion of medical patients and the disparity of bargaining power between pa-
l 19. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
120. See, e.g., Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1264 (1968) (validity of arbitration agree-
ments regarding alimony, child support, and visitation rights).
121. For a discussion of medical malpractice arbitration, see part XV infra.
122. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-
1983).
123. 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212 (1981).
124. Id at 205, 312 N.W.2d at 213.
125. 111 Mich. App. 604, 314 N.W.2d 705 (1982).
126. Id at 611, 314 N.W.2d at 708.
127. 116 Mich. App. 179, 321 N.W.2d 781 (1982).
128. Id at 188, 321 N.W.2d at 785.
129. Id at 186-98, 321 N.W.2d at 785-91.
130. Id at 186, 321 N.W.2d at 785.
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tients and health care providers. 3 ' The court announced a mandatory
eight-step procedure for informing the patient of his options.'3 2 The health
care provider must show by clear and convincing evidence that the patient
was so informed and that he understood this information. The health care
provider also must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agreement was signed voluntarily. 
13 3
This approach could incapacitate the Michigan Medical Malpractice
Arbitration Act just as effectively as if the court declared it unconstitu-
tional. It requires special rules for arbitration agreements that are other-
wise enforceable. Moore illustrates the potential hostility of a court
reviewing an arbitration agreement outside the sphere of business
transactions.
2. Governmental Bodies
Another class-governmental bodies-was involved in Evans Electrical
Construction Co. v. University of Kansas Medical Center,'3 4 where the plaintiff
tried to persuade the Kansas Supreme Court that arbitration agreements
with governmental bodies are unenforceable. '3 5 The plaintiff was a contrac-
tor hired by the Medical Center, a state institution. The work was done
under a contract which provided that, unless mutually agreed, all disputes
regarding the contract were to be settled by arbitration. 36 After a dispute
arose, the parties went to arbitration where the plaintiff lost. It subsequent-
ly filed suit to vacate the award, arguing that an arbitration agreement with
a governmental body was unenforceable.' 37 The court held that an agree-
ment existed between the parties and that the arbitration provision was
valid. The court found "no legal reason why the state agencies in this case
could not enter into a valid agreement for arbitration as a part of the con-
struction contract."' 3 8 It noted that the Kansas version of the U.A.A. only
provides two exceptions to the statute: insurance contracts and contracts
between employers and employees or their representatives.' 39 By listing
these exceptions, said the court, the legislature "did not deem it desirable to
exempt the State and its political subdivisions from the statute."'
t 4 °
131. Id at 195-96 n.20, 321 N.W.2d at 789-90 n.20.
132. Id at 199, 321 N.W.2d at 793.
133. Id
134. 230 Kan. 298, 634 P.2d 1079 (1981).
135. Id at 302, 634 P.2d at 1085. With some modifications, Kansas adopted the
U.A.A. in 1973. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1975).
136. 230 Kan. at 299-300, 634 P.2d at 1082.
137. Id at 302, 634 P.2d at 1083.
138. Id at 303, 634 P.2d at 1084.
139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1975).
140. 230 Kan. at 303, 634 P.2d at 1084. The court acknowledged that the result
might be different under current law. In 1979, the Kansas legislature passed a stat-
ute that prohibited arbitration clauses from being included in standard contracts
1983]
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D. Statutog Causes of Action
A fourth consideration is that an otherwise valid arbitration agreement
ma be rendered unenforceable by a court's policy favoring the litigation of
certain statutory causes of action. In State ex rel Geil v. Corcoran,141 custom-
ers contracted with a brokerage firm for the sale of securities. An arbitra-
tion agreement was included in the contract, which also provided that New
York law would govern its enforcement. The.customers filed a complaint
against the brokerage house alleging a violation of the Missouri Blue Sky
Law.' 42 The brokerage house moved, to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration. 1
4 3
The Missouri Court of Appeals declared the arbitration agreement
void. The court disregarded the contractual choice of New York law, ex-
plaining that "Missouri has a very strong policy in favor of providing a
judicial forum for the claims of investors under the blue-sky laws."' 1 4 The
court pointed out the relevant section of the blue sky statute: "[A]ny condi-
tion, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this act. . . is void."' 45 Although
the contract in Gell was executed prior to the enactment of Missouri's arbi-
tration statute, the court clearly signalled that its decision would be the
same under the new act.
146
Identical results were reached in Sandefer v. Reynolds Securities, Inc. ,147 a
Colorado case, and Kiehne v. Purdy, 4 ' a Minnesota case, both of which also
involved state blue sky laws. Significantly, both the Geil and Sandefer courts
relied on Wilko v. Swan, in which the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced that a similar provision of the Securities Act of 193350 renders
compulsory customer-broker arbitration agreements invalid.''
E. Federal Arbitration Act
The fifth and final consideration is the possibility that an agreement
unenforceable under state law may be revived under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.' 5 2 The federal statute, in much the same language as the U.A.A.,
used for state construction projects. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3741(b) (4) (Gum. Supp.
1982).
141. 623 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
142. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.411 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
143. 623 S.W.2d at 558.
144. Id at 559.
145. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4 09.411(g) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
146. 623 S.W.2d at 559.
147. 618 P.2d 690, 691 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
148. 309 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 1981).
149. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
151. 346 U.S. at 438.
152. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
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states that an arbitration agreement in any contract involving interstate
commerce is "valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 
53
The federal act usually must be applied in state courts as well as fed-
eral courts when the dispute involves a transaction in interstate commerce
or maritime matters regardless of the forum in which it is brought.' 5 4
When the agreement does not involve interstate commerce or maritime
transactions, its enforceability depends on state arbitration law, regardless
of the forum.' 55 The phrase "involving interstate commerce" in the context
of the Federal Arbitration Act relates not only to interstate shipments of
goods but also to contracts with substantial interstate elements. 5 6 Some
courts have required several interstate elements before the federal act ap-
plies.' 57 Others look to whether there were substantial interstate elements
in the contract itself.1
58
In Menill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed,'5 9 the Florida
District Court of Appeal held that it was bound to apply the Federal Arbi-
tration Act despite the invalidity of the agreement under Florida's version
of the U.A.A.16 0 Melamed arose out of a cash management contract between
the plaintiff and Merrill Lynch. The contract required the parties to sub-
mit all disputes to arbitration and also incorporated New York law. The
plaintiff sued, and Merrill Lynch responded by moving to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the federal statute. The trial court denied the motion,
relying on a non-uniform Florida provision that withholds enforcement
from agreements that incorporate the law of foreign states. 6 ' The appel-
late court reversed. The agreement involved interstate commerce, said the
court, and so the federal act applied since it "is a national substantive law
that supplants inconsistent state laws."'
62
The significance of Meamed is increased by consideration of other con-
153. Id § 2. See U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
154. Medical Dev. Corp. v. Independent Moulding, Inc., 479 F.2d 345, 347
(10th Cir. 1973); Pathman Construction Co. v. Knox County Hospital Ass'n, 164
Ind. App. 121, 129, 326 N.E.2d 844, 850 (1975); Fite & Warmath Construction Co.
v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Ky. 1977). Cf Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel
Corp., 304 A.2d 334, 338 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
155. Cook v. Kuljian Corp., 201 F. Supp. 531, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
156. See, e.g., Monte v. Southern Del. County Auth., 321 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir.
1963); Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond F. & P.R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D.D.C.
1981).
157. See, e.g., Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287
F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1961).
158. See, e.g., Burke County Public Schools v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,
413, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (1981).
159. 405 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
161. 405 So. 2d at 791. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
162. 405 So. 2d at 793. The court noted that unfair forum shopping would re-
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tracts which might fall under the broad rubric of interstate commerce.
Under the supercession doctrine, arbitration may be compelled despite a
prohibitive state statute.
F. Summay
From this review of recent case law, it is Apparent that the effect of the
U.A.A. is to enhance the presumptive validity of arbitration agreements.
The numerous exceptions to this basic policy, however, are still taking
shape today, and it is difficult to predict what other judicially engrafted
exceptions to validity will be developed.
III. WAIVER
There are no "bright line" rules as to when or how a party waives its
right to arbitration. The right to arbitration is a contractual right and as
such may be waived expressly or impliedly.163 In Brennan v. Kenwick, 164 the
Illinois Appellate Court noted that waiver is generally found when a party's
conduct has been inconsistent with the arbitration clause, indicating that
the right to arbitration has been abandoned.' 6 5 A party's conduct can also
amount to waiver when, as the Florida District Court of Appeal found in
Marthame Sanders & Co. v. 400 West Madison Corp. ,166 he acknowledges the
existence of an arbitration agreement while submitting arbitrable issues to a
court of law. 67 A lawsuit to enforce a contract usually amounts to a waiver
of the plaintiff's right to arbitration.' 6 8 At what point the proceeding con-
stitutes a waiver, however, is arguable. In Balboa Insurance Co. v. W. G. Mills,
Inc. ,69 the Florida District Court of Appeal noted that answering a com-
plaint, filing reciprocal cross-claims, instituting legal action, and even pre-
suit statements constituted conduct inconsistent with the right to
arbitration. 70
A. Dilatoty Conduct
According to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Wood v. Millers Na-
sult if state courts left enforcement of the Federal Arbitration Act solely to federal
courts. Id
163. Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial, Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Rolls v. Bliss & Nyitray, Inc., 408 So. 2d 229, 237-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Wyo. 1981).
164. 97 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 425 N.E.2d 439 (1981).
165. Id at 1042, 425 N.E.2d at 441.
166. 401 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
167. Id at 1145.
168. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 527 F. Supp. 1141, 1142 (N.D. Fla.
1981).
169. 403 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
170. Id at 150.
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tional Insurance Co. ,7i dilatory conduct by the party seeking arbitration, un-
accompanied by prejudice to the opposing party, does not amount to
waiver. An agreement may contain clauses that require the demand for
arbitration to be made within a reasonable time, but the parties are not the
ones who will determine whether the delay was reasonable. In Rinker Port-
land Cement Co. a. Seidel, 172 the Florida District Court of Appeal held that
the issue is to be resolved by the arbitrator or the trier of fact.1 73 While
delay accompanied by participation in litigation or other specific conduct
may lead to the conclusion that the right to arbitration has been waived,
courts have been reluctant to deny a motion to compel arbitration solely on
the basis of a lapse of time.' 74 In Rolls v. Bliss &Nyitray, Inc., the Florida
District Court of Appeal held that the passage of eight months from the
filing of a complaint before the responding party sought to compel arbitra-
tion, in combination with active participation in discovery and the filing of
a counterclaim, did not constitute a waiver.'
76
B. Participating in the Judicial Process
When discovery is had and the dispute docketed during the period
prior to seeking arbitration, courts have been willing to find conduct incon-
sistent with the exercise of the right to arbitration and therefore have found
waivers. Filing any motion in response to a complaint apparently affects
the party's right to later seek arbitration-the type of response involved is
the determinative factor.1 7 7 A pleading short of an answer does not appear
to amount to a waiver. 7 A motion for a change of venue, as an initial
response to a complaint for breach of contract, may not waive the right to
arbitration. 1
79
1. Motions to Dismiss
An inartfully drawn motion to dismiss can amount to inconsistent con-
duct which a court can use to find a waiver. According to Rinker Portland
171. 96 N.M. 525, 527, 632 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1981).
172. 414 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
173. Id at 630.
174. See, e.g., Brennan v. Kenwick, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1043, 425 N.E.2d 439,
442 (1981).
175. 408 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
176. Id at 238.
177. Hansdn v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 408 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); R.W. Roberts Construction Co. v. Masters & Co., 403 So. 2d 1114,
1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Marthame Sanders & Co. v. 400 W. Madison
Corp., 401 So. 2d 1145, 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Brennan v. Kenwick, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 1040, 1040, 425 N.E.2d 439, 439 (1981).
178. Brennan v. Kenwick, 97 I1. App. 3d 1040, 1043, 425 N.E.2d 439, 441-42
(1981).
179. Id at 1043, 425 N.E.2d at 441.
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Cement, a motion to dismiss based on a contractual right to arbitration may
not require an additional motion to compel arbitration in order to avoid a
waiver since a motion drawn in this fashion is an assertion of the right to
arbitration."' 0 The filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding,
for example, joined by a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim is
subject to arbitration does not waive the right to arbitration.'
8 1
In Balboa Insurance Co. v. W. Mills, Inc. ,182 the Florida District Court
of Appeal held that the words "Motion to Compel Arbitration" need not
appear in the caption of the response in order to avoid waiver.' 8 3 If a mo-
tion to dismiss questions the court's jurisdiction by raising the existence of
the arbitration agreement in any way, waiver will not be found.'8 4 Balboa
Insurance recognizes the coupling of a motion to dismiss with a motion to
compel arbitration as proper.'8 5 A caption on a motion to dismiss lacking
the terms "and motion to compel" is not a waiver of the right to arbitration
as long as the motion to dismiss (the initial response to the complaint) con-
tains an assertion of the existence of the arbitration agreement.'
8 6
In Winter v. Arvida Corp. ,187 the motion to dismiss, though based on the
existence of the arbitration agreement, was not the initial response to the
complaint; the Florida District Court of Appeal was more willing to find a
waiver in that situation.' 88 When a party has, or reasonably should have,
knowledge of the arbitration clause but then files an answer and proceeds
with discovery prior to moving for dismissal, a waiver will be found. The
Arvida court implied that proceeding with discovery after an initial response
in the form of a motion to dismiss would also waive the right to
arbitration. 89
Any consent to submit the controversy to a court supports a finding of
waiver. The extent of the court's involvement is important. When the "ju-
dicial waters" were sufficiently tested prior to a motion to compel arbitra-
tion, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Wood was willing to find a
waiver. 9 ° A motion to dismiss, not asserting the existence of the arbitration
agreement, will effectively preclude the later demand to compel arbitra-
tion.1 9 ' But the mere instigation of legal action is not determinative. The
180. Rinker Portland Cement Corp. v. Seidel, 414 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
181. Id
182. 403 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
183. Id at 1150-51.
184. Id at 1150.
185. Id
186. Id at 1151.
187. 404 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
188. Id at 830.
189. Id
190. Wood v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 525, 527, 632 P.2d 1163, 1165
(1981).
191. Id, 632 P.2d at 1165-66.
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point of no return, according to the Wood court, is when the discretionary
power of the court is invoked prior to a demand for arbitration on a ques-
tion other than the demand for arbitration.19 If the rule were otherwise, a
party could resort to court action until an unfavorable result was reached
and then elect to arbitrate. The timing of the motion to dismiss is not de-
terminative. Active participation in litigation before or after the filing is
inconsistent with the right to arbitration and will amount to a waiver. 193
2. Filing an Answer
The filing of an answer is "participation in inconsistent conduct" and
usually constitutes waiver. In most instances, a complaint answered with-
out demanding arbitration will constitute a waiver of the right.'9 4 In Han-
sen v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. ,195 waiver was found in an answer despite the
assertion therein of arbitration as an affirmative defense. Although plead-
ing may well be governed by its substance rather than its label or caption, it
appears that courts may require stricter compliance when answers, rather
than motions to dismiss, are involved.196
A well-drawn answer may preserve the right to arbitration, while inad-
vertent exclusions may result in a waiver. An answer filed with a counter-
claim may preserve the right to arbitration, while one merely pleading the
arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense may be insufficient. In
Kessler, Merci &Lochner, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. ,197 the Illinois Appel-
late Court held that filing an answer and a counterclaim does not waive a
defendant's right to arbitration where the answer sets up the arbitration
agreement as an affirmative defense and the counterclaim is in the alterna-
tive.' 98 The court noted, however, that waiver will be found where the an-
swer fails to assert the right to arbitration.1 99
As noted above, conduct testing the judicial waters or generally associ-
ated with participation in litigation will usually result in a waiver of the
right to arbitration. The bright line, however dim, appears to be the filing
of an answer by a party or his availing himself of the discretionary power of
the court."° Participation in trial court proceedings such as discovery
192. Id at 527-28, 632 P.2d at 1165.
193. R.W. Roberts Construction Co. v. Masters & Co., 403 So. 2d 1114, 1115
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
194. Marthame Sanders & Co. v. 400 W. Madison Corp., 401 So. 2d 1145, 1145
(Fla. Dist. Ct" App. 1981).
195. 408 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
196. Id; Balboa Ins. Co. v. W.G. Mills, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1149, 1150-51 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
197. 101 Ill. App. 3d 502, 428 N.E.2d 608 (1981).
198. Id at 509, 428 N.E.2d at 613.
199. Id at 508, 428 N.E.2d at 613.
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without a prior demand for arbitration constitutes a waiver. 20 1
3. Lack of Knowledge
Filing an answer to a complaint without including a demand for arbi-
tration amounts to abandonment of the right to arbitration and indicates
consent to the submission of the controversy to the courts.20 2 The court in
Marthame Sanders stated that a party will not be allowed to assert that it was
unaware of its right to arbitration. 2 ' The arbitration provision is incorpo-
rated into the contract, so actual or constructive knowledge is assumed.2" 4
C. Other Considerations
1. Partial Waiver
There are other actions, not amounting to a waiver of the right to arbi-
tration, which nonetheless result in similar consequences. In Ormsbee Devel-
opment Co. v. Grace,2° 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that failure to originally advance issues to arbitration may
foreclose later arbitration of them, consistent with res judicata and princi-
ples of finality.206 When multiple arbitration requests and hearings are pos-
sible, the right to arbitrate issues set forth in subsequent arbitration
demands may be waived to the extent that they were not addressed in the
course of the first proceeding.
20 7
Limited arbitration on one issue does not waive or exclude judicial
hearings on other issues in the same way that a judicial hearing will usually
exclude arbitration. A limited arbitration clause does not explicitly bar
consideration of questions other than those falling within the limited au-
thority implied or expressed by the agreement. 2 8 A party who consents to
the inclusion of a limited arbitration clause in a contract does not waive his
right to a judicial hearing on the merits of a dispute that is not within the
scope of the clause.
20 9
2. Objections to Arbitration Proceedings
As the Illinois Appellate Court explained in Mid-America Regional Bar-
gaining Association v. Modem Builders Industrial Concrete Co. ,2'0 objections to
201. Marthame Sanders & Co. v. 400 W. Madison Corp., 401 So. 2d 1145, 1145
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
202. Id at 1146.
203. Id
204. Id at 1145.
205. 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1982).
206. Id at 1153.
207. Id at 1146-47.
208. Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial, Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
209. Id
210. 101 Ill. App. 3d 83, 427 N.E.2d 1011 (1981).
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arbitration proceedings must be made within certain statutory limits or be
considered waived.2 1' An objection that the award is invalid because the
agreement was invalid must be made within ninety days of the delivery of a
copy of the award.21
Denying the existence of the original contract containing the arbitra-
tion agreement will be seen as a waiver of the right to arbitration. 21 3 A
party impliedly waives its right to arbitration by denying the existence of
an agreement or by failing to implement statutory procedures for requiring
arbitration prior to a resolution of the dispute.
214
3. Waiver of Waiver
The right to waive arbitration proceedings may itself be waived. Just
as a delay in asserting the right to arbitration may waive that right, so a
delay in asserting the right to waive arbitration may waive that right.
2 15
Once arbitration has begun, the right to waive arbitration is waived. This
usually occurs in instances where a plaintiff seeks to arbitrate and the de-
fendant, who prefers to litigate, delays in refusing to arbitrate.
216
IV. ARBITRABILITY
Unless prohibited by statute or public policy, practically any dispute
may be submitted to arbitration provided the parties have agreed to use
arbitration to resolve their controversy and have manifested that intent in a
contract or arbitration agreement. 2
1 7
A. Scope of Contract Language
To resolve many questions of arbitrability, a determination of whether
the dispute is within the scope of a contractual arbitration clause or agree-
ment must be made.21 8 Since the right to arbitrate is governed by contract,
parties may fashion any agreement they wish to limit the scope of the arbi-
211. Id at 87-88, 427 N.E.2d at 1014.
212. Id at 86, 427 N.E.2d at 1014-15. For a discussion of timeliness under the
U.A.A., see Part XII infia.
213. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Wyo.
1981).
214. Id at 1024.
215. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 527 F. Supp. 1141, 1143-44 (N.D.
Fla. 1981).
216. Id at 1143.
217. See Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D.
Cal. 1974); Bolingbrook Park Dist. v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 96 Ill. App.
3d 26, 29, 420 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1981). For a discussion of judicial review of arbi-
trability, see Part XI infra.
218. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1242 (1970).
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tration proceedings.2" 9 They are not required to arbitrate matters that they
did not agree between themselves to arbitrate.2 20 Some courts have deter-
mined that the parties are only bound to arbitrate the issues which, by clear
language, they have agreed to arbitrate; arbitration will not be extended by
construction or implication. 221  Other courts have held that agreements
should be read as broadly as possible and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of arbitrability.
222
The arbitrability of a given issue is controlled by the language of the
arbitration agreement.2 23 Michigan courts, in a number of recent cases,
have used a three-stage analysis to determine the arbitrability of contrac-
tual disputes. In Middle East Transcontinental, Inc. v. Onion Crock, Inc. ,224 the
plaintiff's claim of fraud in the inducement and breach of contract was dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the contract contained
an arbitration clause. After finding that the parties' principal contract con-
tained a valid arbitration agreement, the Michigan Court of Appeals re-
manded for a determination of the arbitrability of the plaintiff's claim.
225
The court stated that before a cause of action can be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the contract calls for arbitra-
tion, the trial court must first find that the claim is in fact arbitrable.
226
The court set forth the three-stage analysis: "(1) whether there exists an
arbitration agreement in a contract between the parties; (2) whether the
dispute is arguably covered by the contract; and (3) whether the dispute is
expressly exempted by the terms of the contract.,
227
Michigan courts also follow the philosophy established by the United
States Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co. 228 when determining whether a dispute under a collective bar-
gaining agreement is arbitrable. While courts are delegated the duty to
219. Grover-Remond Assoc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 297 Minn. 324, 326,
211 N.W.2d 787, 788 (1973).
220. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Loury, 91 Ill. App. 2d 372, 376, 235 N.E.2d
418, 420-21 (1968).
221. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rossini, 14 Ariz. App. 235, 244, 482 P.2d
484, 490 (1971); Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 96, 242 N.E.2d 149,
151 (1968).
222. McCandliss v. Ward W. Ross, Inc., 45 Mich. App. 342, 344-45, 206 N.W.2d
455, 457 (1973).
223. Dunshee v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 303 Minn. 473, 481, 228
N.W.2d 567, 572 (1975); Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of America, 292 Minn. 334,
341, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1972); Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of University of
Minnesota, 266 Minn. 284, 288, 123 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1963).
224. 114 Mich. App. 57, 318 N.W.2d 604 (1982).
225. Id at 60, 318 N.E.2d at 605.
226. Id
227. Id See American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Berry, 80 Mich App. 670, 674,
264 N.W.2d 92, 95-96 (1978).
228. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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determine whether a party has breached its promise to arbitrate, Warrior &
Gulf holds that judicial inquiry must be strictly confined to the question of
whether the party agreed to arbitrate the grievance.2 29 Applying this rule,
the Michigan Court of Appeals held in Southeastern Michzgan Transportation
Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1564230 that a dispute under a
collective bargaining agreement involving the discharge of probationary
employees was nonarbitrable. 23 ' A clause in the bargaining agreement re-
served the power to adjudge and dismiss probationary transit drivers to the
employer without interference by the union. The court found that this
clause made any dispute involving the dismissal of probationary drivers im-
proper for arbitration. The court stated, however, that arbitration clauses
generally are to be construed in favor of covering such disputes unless it can
be conclusively demonstrated that a particular dispute was not an intended
subject of arbitration.232
In City of Pittsburg v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees Local No. 2719,233 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held
that a job qualification and application dispute by a city employee was a
proper matter for arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.2 34
The court found that the agreement between the city and the union clearly
set forth a procedure for filling vacancies in city jobs. The grievance and
arbitration mechanism for resolution of such a dispute was held to be en-
forceable since the dispute definitely arose out of the terms of the
contract.
235
In IKelso-Bumett Co. v. Zeus Development Corp. ,236 the Illinois Appellate
Court held that the matter of when an electrical subcontractor was to be
paid for electrical work done was an arbitrable dispute arising out of its
contract with the general contractor.2 37 The contract provided for arbitra-
tion of all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the subcontract
agreement. The agreement stated that no payment was due the subcon-
tractor until money was received from the owner and until all unsound,
improper, or rejected work had been corrected.238 The court held that the
parties were bound to submit to arbitration only those issues that they had
clearly agreed to arbitrate and that such agreements would not be extended
by construction or implication.2 39 The court went on to say that when a
229. Id at 599.
230. 116 Mich. App. 154, 321 N.W.2d 876 (1982).
231. Id at 158, 321 N.W.2d at 878.
232. Id
233. 107 Pa. Commw. 34, 446 A.2d 1365 (1982).
234. Id at -, 446 A.2d at 1367.
235. Id at -, 446 A.2d at 1368.
236. 107 Ill. App. 3d 34, 437 N.E.2d 26 (1982).
237. Id at -, 437 N.E.2d at 27.
238. Id at -, 437 N.E.2d at 31.
239. Id at -, 437 N.E.2d at 30.
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party moves to dismiss a suit and compel arbitration, the issue of whether
the dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement should be deter-
mined by judicial guidelines. 240
In Slate ex rel. Skinner v. Lombard Co. ,24 another panel of the court con-
sidered whether the arbitration clause of a contract for the construction of a
community college compelled arbitration of only those disputes arising dur-
ing actual construction. The contract contained a work stoppage clause
requiring the contractor to continue work and to maintain a progress sched-
ule during any arbitration proceeding.2 42 Relying on UnitedStates Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Bangor Area Joint School Authority,243 the Skinner court con-
cluded that there was nothing in the work stoppage clause standing alone
that was inconsistent with an intent that the arbitration clause remain en-
forceable after completion of the work.2 4 4 According to the court, since the
claims for breach of contract and negligence in construction arose directly
out of the construction contract and the parties had agreed to arbitrate any
claims arising out of the contract, the parties were required to submit the
dispute to arbitration even though it actually arose after work was com-
pleted and the contract contained a general reservation of remedies
provision. 24
5
In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Industrial Gases, Inc. ,246 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that whether or not a
supplier was contractually entitled to stop delivery of gas to a buyer under a
sales contract was an arbitrable issue.247 The contract provided for arbitra-
tion of all disputes arising out of the contract. The supplier argued that the
dispute was not arbitrable because another section of the contract provided
for a "sole remedy" in the event it failed to provide gas under the contract.
That clause, said the supplier, constituted an agreement not to arbitrate
disputes concerning such a contingency.248 The court concluded, however,
that the supplier had confused the issue of what remedies were available
with the issue of what forum would adjudicate the parties' rights. Contrac-
tual provisions providing for sole remedies define the substantive rights of
the parties, not the arbitrability of the claim.249
240. Id
241. 106 Ill. App. 3d 307, 436 N.E.2d 566 (1982).
242. Id at -, 436 N.E.2d at 567.
243. 355 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
244. 106 Ill. App. 3d at -, 436 N.E.2d at 568.
245. Id
246. 676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
247. I1d at 275.
248. Id at 272.
249. Id at 275.
[Vol. 48
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/11
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
B. Severability of Nonarbitrable Claims
The case of Sandefer v. District Court25 involved the severability of arbi-
trable and nonarbitrable claims arising from the same transaction. The pe-
titioner, a securities buyer, had signed a "Customer Agreement" which
stated that any controversy between the customer and the broker would be
settled by arbitration.2 5 1 The buyer filed claims against the broker for
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and violation of the Colorado Securities
Act.252 The district court compelled arbitration. The Colorado Court of
Appeals found that, since the applicable section of the Colorado Securities
Act was virtually identical to the federal Securities Act of 1933,253 federal
case law making compulsory customer-broker arbitration agreements unen-
forceable was controlling.2 54 The broker then moved to compel arbitration
of the two common law claims and to stay the statutory securities claim.
255
The court used the "intertwining doctrine" to determine whether the com-
mon law claims should be severed from the nonarbitrable statutory claim:
The intertwining doctrine involves an analysis of the legal and
factual issues relative to each of the allegations in the com-
plaint. . . . If the factual determinations and legal conclusions
are inextricably intertwined, then the court must not sever the ac-
tion. To hold otherwise would risk inconsistent determinations
and could result in the arbitrator's infringing upon the court's
duty to decide the securities claim.
256
The court stated that, even though arbitration is an efficient method of
dispute resolution,2 5 7 the language and policy considerations of the securi-
ties regulations took precedence over the policy encouraging arbitration of
250. 635 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981).
251. Id at 548.
252. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51-101 to -129 (1973).
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976). COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(7) (1973) states:
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security
to waive compliance with any provision of this article or any rule or order under
this article is void."
254. 635 P.2d at 549. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
255. 635 P.2d at 548. The motion was made pursuant to COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-22-204(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982):
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be
stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made
under this section, or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect
thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceeding,
the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
This provision is identical to U.A.A. § 2(d) (1955).
256. 635 P.2d at 550. See Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
257. See Columbine Valley Construction Co. v. Board of Directors, 626 P.2d
686, 690 (Colo. 1981).
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disputes. 258
C. Arbitrabilio of Speqftc Claims
1. Constitutional Violations
Courts in several American jurisdictions have recently ruled on the
arbitrability of a variety of contractual disputes. In Minnesota, arbitrators
are without authority to decide issues of alleged constitutional violations no
matter what the contract says. In McGrath v. State,2 59 prison security guards
were disciplined for abuse of sick-leave privileges. They sued for violations
of their constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed the suit because the
dispute came within the scope of a collective bargaining agreement between
the guards and the state, and it ordered the dispute to arbitration.260 The
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that constitutional issues are
not arbitrable.261 The court further stated that, if an otherwise arbitrable
dispute contains general allegations of constitutional violations, the arbitra-
tor could proceed on the arbitrable issues and the constitutional issues may
be raised at the time of judicial review of the arbitration determination. 262
In a concurring opinion in McGrath, Judge Scott argued that arbitra-
tors should be able to decide constitutional issues where the parties indicate
a clear intent to arbitrate them. 26 3 To hold otherwise, he said, would frus-
trate public policy which favors arbitration and speedy resolution of dis-
putes without resort to litigation.2 64
2. Domestic Relations
In Crutchly v. Crutchey,265 the North Carolina Court of Appeals deter-
mined that disputes concerning spousal support did not constitute a statu-
tory or policy exception to arbitration.2 66 The plaintiff had argued that the
arbitration award was subject to modification because it did not comply
with the procedure in actions for alimony or alimony pendente i'te. The
court rejected that argument, holding that because the parties had agreed
to arbitration, the statutory provisions did not apply.2 67 The court cited
General Statutes of North Carolina section 1-567.2(a),2 8 which provides
that parties "may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy
258. 635 P.2d at 550. See Sandefer v. Reynolds, 618 P.2d 690, 691 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1980).
259. 312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1981).
260. Id at 440-41.
261. Id at 442.
262. Id
263. Id at 442-43 (Scott, J., concurring).
264. Id at 443 (Scott, J., concurring).
265. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981). See also Part XII.C infra.
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existing between them at the time of the agreement," and that the agree-
ment "shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except with the consent
of all the parties, without regard to the justiciable character of the contro-
versy."2 69 The court noted that the legislature had enacted two specific
exceptions to the general rule,2 70 neither of which was applicable, and that
the legislature could have declared domestic issues nonarbitrable.2 7 Since
it did not, the court had to assume that a controversy concerning the
amount of spousal support was arbitrable. 72 In support of this position,
the court noted that North Carolina allows spouses, upon the dissolution of
a marriage, to enter into an agreement concerning the wife's rights to sup-
port or alimony and stated that if spouses could contract with regard to
these issues, it seemed logical that they could contract to arbitrate their
disputes.2
73
Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace274 addressed the possible conflict with
public policy that might occur if a person's community property interest in
real property was terminated in an arbitration proceeding to which he was
not made a party. The petitioner in Grace had entered into a lease agree-
ment with the respondent in which the parties agreed to submit any dis-
putes to arbitration.2 7 5 At the respondent's request, a hearing was held and
the arbitrator determined that the leases had expired on the termination
dates defined in the leases. The respondent and his wife then filed separate
appeals, contending that her property interest in the leases could not be
terminated by arbitration because she was not a party to the contract.
276
The Tenth Circuit found that, although the wife had not signed the agree-
ment, she was "a party to the proceeding and represented by counsel
throughout. '277 The respondent's argument appeared to the court as an
attempt to avoid the consequences of the arbitration upon which the parties
had insisted.2 78
The public policy question raised in Grace was not answered. The
court held that because the wife had in fact been an active participant in
the arbitration hearings her claim was without merit. The court gave no
indication of how the issue would be resolved if presented in a case in which
a spouse neither signed the arbitration agreement nor played any role in the
269. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) (Supp. 1979).
270. Id § 1-567.2(b). The statute excepts (1) agreements that specifically state
that the law shall not apply and (2) collective bargaining agreements, unless they
specify that the law applies. Id.
271. 53 N.C. App. at 737, 281 S.E.2d at 747.
272. Id
273. Id
274. 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1982).
275. Id at 1143.
276. Id at 1146.
277. Id at 1147.
278. Id. at 1148.
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arbitration proceedings. 2 79
D. Proper Forum for Determining Arbitrabiio
There are two aspects to arbitrability: the procedural issues and the
substantive ones. In general, courts have agreed that while the court should
make the initial determination of substantive arbitrability, procedural ques-
tions relevant to arbitrability are to be decided by the arbitrator.
In Village of Carpenters ille V. Mayfair Construction Co. ,280 the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court considered, for the first time, whether questions concerning
compliance with procedural requirements relative to arbitration are to be
determined by the court or the arbitrator. The Village contended that
Mayfair had not complied with the contract provisions for the initiation of
arbitration. 8 1
It should be noted that the treatment of arbitrability of procedural
disputes has not been uniform. Federal courts apply the rule, stated by the
United States Supreme Court in john Wiley &Sons v. Livingston,2 8 2 that pro-
cedural questions are for the arbitrator. The Supreme Court reasoned that
dividing disputes into substantive and procedural aspects, each decided in a
different forum, would only encourage delay.2 83 The majority of state
courts also relegate questions of procedure to the arbitrator.
284
The Mayfair Construction court employed the analysis used by the New
York Court of Appeals in United Nations Development v. Norkin Plumbing285
and concluded that "the matters of timeliness and waiver and the other
procedural matters in question should be decided by the arbitrator."28 6
This approach requires the court to make an initial determination whether
the conditions in the arbitration contract are statutoy conditions precedent
or contractual conditions precedent. Statutory conditions fall within the
threshold jurisdiction of the court while contractual conditions require fur-
ther analysis.28 7 At that point the inquiry turns to the nature of the arbitra-
tion agreement-whether its arbitration clause is broad or narrow. If the
agreement contains a broad clause, compliance with contractual notice pro-
visions and time requirements are questions to be considered by the arbitra-
tor.28  But if the parties have withheld "full power" from the arbitrator,
the court may maintain jurisdiction to determine whether there has been
compliance with a condition precedent to submission of a claim to
279. Id
280. 100 Ill. App. 3d 128, 426 N.E.2d 558 (1981).
281. Id at 131, 426 N.E.2d at 561.
282. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
283. Id at 558.
284. 100 Ill. App. at 132-33, 426 N.E.2d at 562.
285. 45 N.Y.2d 358, 380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978).
286. 100 Ill. App. at 133, 426 N.E.2d at 562.
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arbitration.2 8 9
In adopting this analysis, the court reasoned that procedural questions
often must be resolved by construing the contract as a whole in the light of
the customs and practices of the industry. This task is peculiarly one within
the competence of the arbitrator.
290
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the Mayfair Construction
court in Minnesota Federation of Teachers Local 331 v. Independent School Dis-
trict. The school board in the case adopted a proposal increasing the
assignments of teachers by increasing student contact time. The union
moved to compel arbitration of the decision. The board contended that its
action was a matter of inherent managerial policy and hence was not sub-
ject to arbitration.2 92 The union argued that the increase in student con-
tact time was in effect an increase in the teachers' hours of employment
which affected their rate of compensation and thus the economic aspects of
their positions. Both "hours of employment" and "economic aspects" were
included in the arbitration agreement. 29" The agreement, however, was
subject to school board policies, one of which was that the teachers' daily
teaching load would be assigned according to the needs of the buildings and
would not necessarily be uniform.
2 94
The court stated that the critical determination was whether the in-
crease in student contact time was a "term and condition of employment"
or an "educational policy of the school district" and held that this determi-
nation should be made initially by the arbitrator.295 The court noted that
arbitrability was to be determined by "ascertaining the intent of the parties
from the language of the agreement itself,"'296 but if the intent was reason-
ably debatable, the issue should be determined by the arbitrator subject to
vacation of the award if the arbitrator exceeded his powers.29?
289. Id at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427. See, e.g., Blends, Inc. v.
Schottland Mills, 35 A.D.2d 377, 378-79, 316 N.Y.S.2d 912, 913-14, afldmem., 29
N.Y.2d 575, 272 N.E.2d 892, 324 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971).
290. Norkin Plumbing, 45 N.Y.2d at 365, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
See NAPA Ass'n v. County of Napa, 98 Cal. App. 3d 263, 268, 159 Cal. Rptr. 522,
525 (1979).
291. 310 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 1981).
292. Id at 483.
293. Id
294. Id at 484.
295. Id
296. Id See State v. Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. 1977).
297. 310 N.W.2d at 484. See Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 292 Minn.
334, 341, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1972). A court may vacate an award where the
arbitrator has exceeded his powers or where there was no arbitration agreement, the
issue was not adversely determined in other proceedings, and the party did not
participate without objection in the arbitration hearing. MINN. STAT. ANN.
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In Department of Educational & Cultural Services v. Maine State Employees
Association,298 the issue of which forum should make the initial determina-
tidn of substantive arbitrability was raised. The collective bargaining
agreement between the parties provided that the arbitrator would make a
preliminary determination regarding whether an issue was arbitrable.2 99
The Department contended that the arbitrator should make this prelimi-
nary decision only if the issue had first been raised before the arbitrator, not
the court. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this interpretation,
holding that the parties had stipulated that in the first instance the arbitra-
tor would decide the issue of arbitrability.30 0 To hold otherwise, said the
court, would render the clause meaningless, put a "premium on winning a
race to the courthouse and make the outcome turn on fortuities of timing
and forum." 30 1 The court went on to say that, although the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement may stipulate that the arbitrator make the
initial decision, the final determination of substantive arbitrability was a
function of the court, not the arbitrator.3 °2 The only time a court could be
excluded from this determination would be in a case where the parties
clearly demonstrated their intent to make the arbitrator's determination of
substantive arbitrability final.30 3
In Mid-America Regional Bargaining Association v. Modem Builders Industrial
Concrete Co. ,304 the Illinois Appellate Court confronted the questions of
(1) when disputes concerning arbitrability may be raised and (2) who deter-
mines the arbitrability of an issue. The defendant had not appeared at the
arbitration hearing and had refused to pay the award. It first raised its
objection to the validity of the agreement when the plaintiff sought to have
the award confirmed.30 5
The defendant's claim that it was not a party to the agreement, said
the court, would be a defense only if timely raised °.3 6 The defendant ar-
gued that the issue of whether an arbitration agreement existed could only
be adjudicated by the court prior to arbitration in a proceeding to compel
arbitration. 0 7 The plaintiffs attempt to confirm the award, said the de-
fendant, was really a proceeding to compel arbitration, and therefore the
298. 433 A.2d 415 (Me. 1981).
299. Id at 418.
300. Id at 419.
301. Id
302. Id See Westbrook School Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d
204, 207 n.5 (Me. 1979).
303. 433 A.2d at 419 n.2.
304. 101 Ill. App. 3d 83, 427 N.E.2d 1011 (1981).
305. Id at 86, 427 N.E.2d at 1013.
306. Id An application must be made within 90 days after delivery of a copy of
the award to the applicant. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Cum.
Supp. 1982-1983). For a discussion of timeliness under the U.A.A., see Part XII
infra.
307. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 86, 427 N.E.2d at 1013.
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objection had been made at the proper time.308 The court agreed that in
Illinois "the question of arbitrability is determined not by the arbitrator but
by the court, 30 9 but rejected the argument that the arbitrability of the dis-
pute must be determined prior to arbitration.3 1 0 While the question may be
determined before the hearing in an action to compel3 1f ' or stay arbitra-
tion, 1 2 it need not be.313 Citing the U.A.A.'s section on vacating
awards,3 4 the court declared that it was clear that the question of arbi-
trability can be raised after an award is granted if it was not raised before or
during the hearing.3 1 5 The consequence of a failure to timely file a motion
to vacate an award is the confirmation of the award by the court. The




In order to determine arbitrability, courts have had to go beyond the
question of whether a dispute falls within the scope of a contractual arbitra-
tion agreement. In some cases, for example, the conflict between statutory
and public policy considerations and the policy favoring arbitration had to
be resolved. In other cases, the courts had to address the issue of what role
the arbitrator should play in relation to the court in determining compli-
ance with procedural requirements as well as issues of substantive arbi-
trability. In all cases, the intent of the parties was a major consideration
and was given considerable weight in resolving the issue.
V. PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
Courts may stay arbitration proceedings on application of a party. 7
Generally, the sole issue in a stay proceeding is whether the dispute is sub-
308. Id at 87, 427 N.E.2d at 1014.
309. Id. See Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union Local
1600, 87 Ill. App. 3d 246, 252, 408 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (1980).
310. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 427 N.E.2d at 1014.
311. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 102(a) (Smith-Hurd 1975).
312. Id § 102(b).
313. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 427 N.E.2d at 1014.
314. U.A.A. § 12(a)(5) (1955). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 112(a)(5)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
315. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 427 N.E.2d at 1014.
316. Id at 86, 427 N.E.2d at 1013. See Schroud v. Van C. Argiris & Co., 78 Ill.
App. 3d 1092, 1096, 398 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1979).
317. Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration are governed by U.A.A. § 2
(1955), which provides:
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in
Section 1, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the Court shall
order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the Court shall proceed
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbi-
33
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ject to arbitration."' If it is, the court will order the parties to proceed to
arbitration. 19 When an agreement subjects all contract disputes to arbitra-
tion, the court may summarily determine that arbitration is required. 2
Two recent opinions involving multiple parties, Sillwater Leased Housing As-
sociates v. Kraus Anderson Construction Co. 321 andJ.F Inc. v. Vieik, 22 applied
similar logic to analogous situations but reached different conclusions re-
garding the stay of arbitration proceedings.
Stillwater involved an appeal from a stay" of arbitration proceedings.
The owner had hired a contractor to construct a building using the designs
and plans prepared by an architect under contract to the owner. Both con-
tracts contained arbitration clauses. The owner had also hired an engineer
to perform soil tests, the results of which were incorporated into the archi-
tect's plans and specifications given to the contractor. The owner's contract
with the engineer did not contain an arbitration clause.3 23 The contractor
filed a demand for arbitration and the owner moved to stay the arbitration
tration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be
denied.
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to ar-
bitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be
forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the mov-
ing party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties
to proceed to arbitration.
(c) If an issue referable to arbitration under the alleged agreement
is involved in an action or proceeding pending in a court having jurisdic-
tion to hear applications under subdivision (a) of this Section, the applica-
tion shall be made therein. Otherwise and subject to Section 18, the
application may be made in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitra-
tion shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor
has been made under this Section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may
be with respect thereto only. When the application is made in such action
or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
(e) An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that
the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds
for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown.
318. Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir.
1982) (applying Illinois law); J.F. Inc. v. Vicik, 99 111. App. 3d 815, 816, 426 N.E.2d
257, 259 (1981); Lester Witte & Co. v. Lundy, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 1101, 425
N.E.2d 1, 3 (1981).
319. For a discussion of arbitrability of claims, see Part IV supra.
320. Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Gir.
1982); Lester Witte & Co. v. Lundy, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 1104, 425 N.E.2d 1, 3
(1981).
321. 319 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. 1982).
322. 99 Ill. App. 3d 815, 426 N.E.2d 257 (1981).
323. 319 N.W.2d at 425.
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proceedings. The trial court granted the stay based on the owner's argu-
ment that the court had discretion to stay arbitration proceedings in order
to consolidate related claims.324 On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, the owner argued that the provisions of section 2 of the U.A.A. were
mandatory and permitted a court to look only for the existence of an agree-
ment to arbitrate in deciding whether to order or stay proceedings. 325
The court, however, stressed that judicial discretion and the balancing
of other considerations affected the application of U.A.A. provisions.3 26
Specifically, the court referred to an earlier Minnesota case, Prestressed Con-
crete, Inc. v. Ado/Ison &Peterson, Inc. ,327 which announced a balancing test for
use in determining whether to order arbitration. The test weighs the inter-
ests of the parties to the arbitration agreement and the policy supporting
arbitration against the interests of the other parties and the policies sup-
porting joinder of parties and claims.3 28 The Stillwater court did not ex-
pressly apply the test; it held simply that the arbitration proceedings should
continue because three out of the four parties involved in the dispute were
parties to arbitration agreements and because arbitration would decrease
delay, complexity, and costs.
329
This balancing approach was similarly used in JF Inc. v. Viik,33
which also concerned a construction dispute between multiple parties.33 ' A
contractor agreed to build a house for the owners. The contract contained
a clause subjecting all disputes to arbitration unless the parties agreed
otherwise. A dispute involving the contract developed, and the parties at-
324. Id at 426.
325. Id See U.A.A. § 2 (1955). For the text of this provision, see note 317 supra.
326. 319 N.W.2d at 427.
327. 308 Minn. 20, 240 N.W.2d 551 (1976). The case involved a suit for dam-
ages in which only two out of five parties had agreed by contract to arbitrate any
disputes arising out of a parking lot project.
328. Id at 22, 240 N.W.2d at 552.
329. 319 N.W.2d at 427. The court stressed that proceedings to determine lia-
bility could proceed in series. The owner would arbitrate with the contractor. If
the owner was found liable, he could seek indemnity from the architect and the
engineer. The court concluded that since the Prestressed Concrete balancing test fa-
vored arbitration and the dispute was clearly within the scope of the agreement, the
motion to stay arbitration should have been granted. Id In City of Hot Springs v.
Gundersons, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1982), the South Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the risk of multiple lawsuits, instituted in different forums by par-
ties not subject to the arbitration agreement and arising out of the same facts and
circumstances, was not sufficient to override the arbitration agreement between the
two parties to the dispute. Id at 11.
330. 99 Ill. App. 3d 815, 426 N.E.2d 257 (1981).
331. Id at 817, 426 N.E.2d at 259. Only two of the six parties involved (the
owners and the contractor) were parties to the arbitration agreement. The others
were subcontractors and material suppliers. The contractor wanted arbitration,
while the owners wanted to consolidate all of the suits.
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tempted to negotiate their differences. Meanwhile, subcontractors who
were not parties to the arbitration agreement brought suits to foreclose
mechanic's liens against the owners and the contractor. 3 2 Negotiations be-
tween the owners and the contractor broke down, and the contractor de-
manded arbitration. The owners moved to consolidate the foreclosure suits
and requested that arbitration proceedings be stayed pending judicial
resolution. 3
33
The trial court granted the motion to consolidate and denied the mo-
tion to stay. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed.33 4 The contractor con-
tended that the court had the power to stay an arbitration proceeding "only
upon a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate." '3 3 5 Although the
general rule in Illinois is that "agreements to arbitrate will be enforced de-
spite pending multi-party litigation," the court noted that the outcome may
be different where the claims of multiple parties are more intermingled and
dependent.3 3 6 It held that the Prestressed Concrete balancing test controlled
and said that in limited circumstances an arbitration proceeding may be
stayed if all parties to it are not bound by the arbitration agreement. 337 In
determining whether the policies favoring joinder of claims outweigh those
favoring arbitration, the important factors include: (1) whether arbitration
would increase delay, complexity, and costs because it could not include all
parties; (2) whether the issues and relationships among the parties are
closely intermingled; and (3) the possibility that the judicial and arbitration
forums will reach inconsistent results.
338
Applying this analysis to the facts at hand, the court decided that in
Viik, unlike Stillwater, the policies supporting joinder of claims outweighed
those favoring arbitration.33 9 It concluded that section 2 of the U.A.A. did
not provide the exclusive ground for a stay of arbitration.3"'
The significance of Vick is highlighted by another Illinois decision,
Kelso-Burnett Co. v. Zeus Development Corp. ,31 which involved a contract that
332. Id at 816, 426 N.E.2d at 258.
333. Id at 817, 426 N.E.2d at 259.
334. Id at 819, 426 N.E.2d at 262.
335. Id at 817, 426 N.E.2d at 259.
336. Id at 818, 426 N.E.2d at 260 (citing Iser Elec. Co. v. Fossier Builders, Ltd.,
84 Ill. App. 3d 161, 405 N.E.2d 439 (1980)).
337. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 819-20, 426 N.E.2d at 261. Usually, a party bound by an
arbitration agreement has no right to choose between judicial and arbitral forums.
The court noted, however, that the owners did not try to avoid arbitration until
third party suits complicated the matter, nor were the owners responsible for the
multiplicity problem. Id at 820, 426 N.E.2d at 261. The court might have reached
a different result had it appeared that the owners were trying to subvert the arbitra-
tion agreement.
338. Id at 820, 426 N.E.2d at 261.
339. Id
340. Id at 821, 426 N.E.2d at 261-62.
341. 107 Ill. App. 3d 34, 437 N.E.2d 26 (1982).
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subjected all disputes to arbitration. Kelso-Burnett defaulted because it
had not been paid, and Zeus terminated the contract. Kelso-Burnett com-
menced an action in circuit court. Zeus moved to stay judicial proceedings
and compel arbitration.3 4 2 The court denied the motion to stay and refused
to compel arbitration. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that
the lower court had abused its discretion in not compelling arbitration.
343
The Illinois arbitration act provides:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitra-
tion shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application
therefor has been made under this Section or, if the issue is severa-
ble, the stay may be with respect thereto only. When the applica-
tion is made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration
shall include such stay.3 "4
Kelso-Burnett's payment was a matter arising out of the contract, and it
therefore was subject to the arbitration clause.345
Once the court finds an issue is arbitrable, the U.A.A. offers two ways
to treat the judicial action.3 46 Pending arbitration, the court may stay the
entire proceeding or stay only those arbitrable claims that are severable.
34 7
The appellate court found that the trial court would have been required to
choose one of those two alternatives. 348 Kelso-Burnett, however, argued a
third option. Relying on Vicik, it asserted that the lower court had properly
stayed the arbitration proceedings despite the valid agreement to arbi-
trate.349 The court, rejecting this argument, distinguished Vicik on the
grounds that neither of the parties in Vicik had instituted multiple proceed-
ings to avoid arbitration and the claims not subject to arbitration were
closely intermingled with those that were.3 5 The court found that Kelso-
Burnett had itself created the multiplicity problem by initiating an action
in circuit court prior to arbitration and saw no nonarbitrable issues closely
intermingled with arbitrable issues. 351 The court concluded that Vicik did
not compel a stay.
352
Kelso-Bumett illustrates the problems created by engrafting a factor test
onto section 2(d) of the U.A.A. The section plainly limits stays to cases
where there is no agreement to arbitrate. 35 3 The factor test precludes sum-
mary determination because it forces the court to weigh the policies favor-
342. Id. at -, 437 N.E.2d at 27-28.
343. Id at -, 437 N.E.2d at 32.
344. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 102(d) (Smith-Hurd 1975); U.A.A. § 2(d) (1955).
345. 107 Ill. App. 3d at -, 437 N.E.2d at 32.
346. See U.A.A. § 2 (1955). For the text of this section, see note 317 supra.
347. U.A.A. § 2 (1955).
348. 107 Ill. App. 3d at -, 437 N.E.2d at 31.
349. Id at -, 437 N.E.2d at 29.
350. Id at -, 437 N.E.2d at 32.
351. Id
352. Id
353. U.A.A. § 2(d) (1955).
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ing arbitration against those favoring joinder of claims. This complicates
the stay proceeding and provides a springboard for parties determined to
avoid arbitration. Vicik and Stillwater undermine the force of arbitration
agreements and invite delay in dispute resolution.
VI. AWARDS
Six sections of the U.A.A. deal specifically with awards.354 Generally,
an award must be in writing, signed by the arbitrators, and delivered to the
parties within a fixed period of time.3 55 The arbitrators may, on motion by
the parties, modify an award within a fixed period after it has been made if
there is a miscalculation, a mistaken description of a person or thing re-
ferred to in the award, or some other imperfection that does not affect the
merits of the controversy. 356 Any party may ask the appropriate court to
confirm, vacate, or modify an award if the request is made within the speci-
fied time limits.3 57 Once the court enters its order, the award has the same
effect as any other judgment or judicial decree and may be enforced in the
same manner. 35  In applying the U.A.A. to arbitral awards, recent cases
have dealt with (1) the grounds for attacking an award; (2) the effect of an
arbitrator's attempt to modify an award; (3) the binding effect of the
award; and (4) the reasons given by the arbitrator for his decision.
A. Groundsfor Attacking Awards
1. Lack of Arbitral Authority
In recent litigation, the most common ground for attacking an arbitra-
tor's award is that he exceeded his authority. 359 Courts usually say that the
U.A.A. should be liberally interpreted and applied, noting that its basic
functions are to discourage litigation and provide a speedy and relatively
inexpensive forum for the resolution of disputes.36' A narrow interpretation
of the arbitrator's power under the U.A.A. would simply convert an arbitra-
tion proceeding into a court of original jurisdiction. In that event, an arbi-
354. Id §§8,9, 11, 12, 13, 14.
355. Id § 8.
356. Id §§ 9, 13. An award may be vacated if it was gained by corruption or
fraud, if there was partiality by an arbitrator, if the arbitrators exceeded their pow-
ers, if the arbitrators refused to hear evidence, or if there was no arbitration agree-
ment. An award may be modified if there was a miscalculation or mistaken
description of a person or thing referred to in the award, if the arbitrators made the
award based on an issue not submitted to them, or if there was some other imperfec-
tion not affecting the merits of the controversy. Id §§ 12, 13.
357. Id § 11. For a discussion of timeliness under the U.A.A., see Part XII infra.
358. U.A.A. § 14 (1955).
359. For a discussion of confirmation and vacation of awards, see Part VII infra.
For a discussion of judicial review of such awards, see Part XI infra.
360. See, e.g., Dunshee v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 303 Minn. 473, 481,
228 N.W.2d 567, 572 (1975).
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tration award would be appealable in the same manner as a judgment of
any court and many of the advantages of arbitration would be lost.
The U.A.A. provides that the court shall vacate an award when the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers,3 6 1 but courts have liberally con-
strued those powers. The arbitrator is considered to be the final judge of
law and fact in the absence of an agreement limiting his authority. 6 Pol-
icy considerations, however, are independent of the arbitration agreement
and courts may review the merits of an award when the arbitrator has
based that award on public policy.363 In deciding whether an arbitrator
ha exceeded his power, a court must first determine the extent of that
power by inquiring into the source of the arbitrator's authority.
In Ramsey County v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees,a6 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a situation in
which the past practice of the parties, as well as their communications dur-
ing negotiations on the agreement, conflicted with the unambiguous lan-
guage of the agreement. The plaintiff challenged the award on the ground
that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers by issuing an award based on
past conduct and not on the clear language of the agreement.
3 65
The court first noted that the scope of an arbitrator's power is a matter
of contract to be determined from the parties' agreement 6 6 but pointed out
that this proposition does not clearly define the limits of arbitral authority.
The court used the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
the Steelworkers' Tlogy.36 7 The Court in those cases formulated what has
come to be called the "essence" test: "[A]n arbitrator is confined to inter-
pretation and application of the. . . arbitration agreement. . . . He may
of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the . . . agreement. ' 368 In deter-
mining whether the award in Ramsey County met this standard, the Michi-
gan court relied on federal case law. An award, said the court, draws its
essence from the agreement
361. U.A.A. § 12(3) (1955).
362. Cournoyer v. American Television & Radio Co., 249 Minn. 577, 580, 83
N.W.2d 409, 411 (1957).
363. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680
F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1982).
364. 309 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1981).
365. Id at 786.
366. Id at 789 (citing Children's Hospital v. Minnesota Nurses Ass'n, 265
N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. 1978)). See also City National Bank v. Westlund Towers
Apartments, 107 Mich. App. 213, 233, 309 N.W.2d 209, 219 (1981) (arbitration
agreement sets limits of arbitrator's authority).
367. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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so long as the interpretation can in some rational manner be de-
rived from the agreement, "viewed in the light of its language, its
context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where
there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsup-
ported by principles of contract construction and the law of the
shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award.
'3 69
In applying these principles, the court ruled that it was permissible for the
arbitrator to draw on evidence other than the agreement in determining the
parties' intent. Accordingly, the court upheld the award even though it was
inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the agreement.370
In City National Bank v. Westlund Towers Apartments,3 7' the Michigan
Court of Appeals limited the arbitrator's power to interpret the agreement.
The case involved a request by an attorney for $9,020 in fees; the opposing
parties denied that he was their attorney. The $9,020 was placed in escrow.
After the proceedings, the arbitrator awarded the attorney $33,000.372 The
award was challenged on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his
authority. After acknowledging that the limits of arbitral authority are set
by the agreement, the court found that the arbitrator had erred in inter-
preting the parties' intent.3 73 The court thought it obvious that the parties
had intended to limit the award to the amount held in escrow.37 4
The Michigan court's decision in Westlund Towers seems to be at odds
with that of the Minnesota court in Ramsey County. In Ramse County, the
court allowed the arbitrator broad discretion in going outside the unambig-
uous language of the agreement to find intent; in Westlund Towers, the lan-
guage was ambiguous, yet the court limited the arbitrator to what the court
felt to be the parties' obvious intent. The Michigan decision implies that
there are limits of reasonableness beyond which an arbitrator may not go in
interpreting the intent of the parties.
369. 309 N.W.2d at 792 (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers, 548 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977)).
370. 309 N.W.2d at 793. The majority opinion in Ramsey County reasoned that
the parties had bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation" of their agreement, not
that of the court. In dissent, Justice Peterson believed that the court extended the
arbitrator's power too far. There was explicit language in the agreement that the
arbitrator would have no right to modify any of the contract terms, which the jus-
tice felt further indicated the express intent of the parties that the arbitrator base
his decision on the unambiguous terms of the agreement. Id at 795 (Peterson, J.,
dissenting). He would hold that where it is clear from the agreement that the par-
ties' intent was to limit the arbitrator's power, the court must hold the arbitrator
within those limits. Id
371. 107 Mich. App. 213, 309 N.W.2d 209 (1981).
372. Id at 217, 309 N.W.2d at 210.
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2. Jurisdiction
Arbitral power and authority have been limited most significantly in a
jurisdictional sense, and it is the arbitration agreement that defines their
boundaries.3 75 The agreement sets out those issues that the parties intend
to arbitrate, and it is the agreement that effectively grants the arbitrator the
jurisdiction to resolve certain enumerated issues.
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1400 v. Citizens Gas
& Coke Utility,3 76 the arbitrator was deciding on the qualifications of a job
applicant. The arbitrator explicitly acknowledged that a high school de-
gree was a requirement for the job in question, and he also found that the
applicant did not meet that requirement.3 77 Nevertheless, he awarded the
position to the applicant because the requirement was unreasonable.
378
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator exceeded his author-
ity by examining the reasonableness of the requirement.3 79 The dispute sub-
mitted by the parties was whether the applicant met the job requirements,
not whether those requirements were reasonable. The court carefully lim-
ited its holding to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, pointing out that it did
not intend to limit the discretion and power of an arbitrator to whom a
dispute had been submitted.380
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision, State v. Minnesota Teamsters
Public & Law Enforcement Employees Union,3" also demonstrates the jurisdic-
tion-granting aspect of an arbitration agreement. The administrators of a
prison suspended a guard for disciplinary reasons. The parties to the arbi-
tration agreement stipulated that the arbitrator was to decide whether "just
cause" existed for the discipline.3 82 The Minnesota Supreme Court found
that the agreement gave the arbitrator the authority to make the just cause
determination.3 8 3 By failing to define specifically what acts constituted just
cause, the parties left the decision to the arbitrator. If the collective bar-
gaining agreement had specified that certain acts would constitute just
cause, the arbitrator would have had only the authority to determine
whether those acts had been committed. 8 4
375. Waterford Ass'n of Educ. Secretaries v. Waterford School Dist., 95 Mich.
App. 107, 110, 290 N.W.2d 95, 97 (1980).
376. - Ind. App. -, 428 N.E.2d 1320 (1981).
377. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1328.
378. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1323.
379. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1326.
380. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1325.
381. 316 N.W.2d 542 (Minn. 1982).
382. Id at 544.
383. Id at 545.
384. Id at 544-45.
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3. Awards Inconsistent with Law
In Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union,385 the Board challenged
the arbitrator's award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his
power by granting an award inconsistent with the law. A teacher was as-
saulted in a classroom and was unable to return to work for twenty-nine
months. The Board paid her salary for the remainder of the school year but
refused to continue payments for the subsequent two years. The issue was
submitted to arbitration.38 6 Meanwhile, the teacher filed for and received
workers' compensation. The arbitrator subsequently awarded the teacher
her salary for the full period. The Board argued that the award was incon-
sistent with the workers' compensation statute, which limited recovery of
compensation outside the statute.
3 87
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the arbitrator's award was con-
sistent with the law.3 88 The court indicated that the arbitrator's power does
not depend on his correct interpretation of the law. While a case must be
decided according to the law, the arbitrator is to be his own judge as to
what the law is because what the parties have bargained for is his interpre-
tation, not that of a court.38 9 Where the interpretation of the law is by
agreement in the hands of the arbitrator, a mistake of law is not a ground
for vacating an award.39 °
4. Defects in the Award
In Risman v. Granader,3 9 ' the plaintiffs, the defendant, and a third party
were all involved in a joint venture. The defendants had refused to make
certain capital contributions as required by the agreement. The plaintiffs,
acting as managing partners, sought arbitration as provided in the agree-
ment. The arbitrator required both the plaintiffs and the defendant to
make payments into the joint venture, which inured to the benefit of the
third party. The award was attacked on the ground that that arbitrator
had exceeded his power because (1) the award was to the benefit of the
third party and the project, rather than to one of the parties to the arbitra-
tion; and (2) he issued a blanket award covering all claims, rather than a
specific award for each claim.
392
In addressing the first issue, the Michigan Court of Appeals said that
because all of the parties to the joint venture agreement were parties to the
385. 86 Ill. 2d 469, 427 N.E.2d 1199 (1981).
386. Id at 473, 427 N.E.2d at 1200.
387. Id
388. Id at 477, 427 N.E.2d at 1202.
389. Id (citing White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 I11. 578, 77 N.E.2d 327
(1906)).
390. 86 Il1. 2d at 477, 427 N.E.2d at 1202.
391. 107 Mich. App. 453, 309 N.W.2d 562 (1981).
392. Id at 455, 309 N.W.2d at 562-63.
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arbitration agreement, all were entitled to benefit from any arbitration.3 93
An award will be valid as long as those benefited by it are parties to the
agreement, whether or not they are parties to the dispute. Regarding the
second issue, the court indicated that, while it might be preferable for arbi-
trators to issue awards addressed to specific claims, 394 that procedure is not
required in most instances.3 95 The court implied, however, that a situation
may arise where the arbitrator must address his award to specific issues.
The court seemed to suggest that where the arbitrator has been required by
the court to make specific findings, the award must address itself to those
findings.3 9
6
In Mid-America Regional Bargaining Association v Modem Business Industrial
Concrete Co. ," the defendant was a member of the bargaining association
and had agreed to certain lockout provisions in case of isolated strike ac-
tions. It failed to comply with these provisions and the association, in arbi-
tration, was awarded $100 a day for each employee at work at the
defendant's business during the lockout.3 98 The defendant asserted that the
arbitrator had exceeded his authority in that the agreement required the
arbitrator to determine total damages and that the award was not suffi-
ciently specific to meet that requirement. 39 9 The Illinois Appellate Court
rejected that argument, holding that an award is valid even though the
actual amount of the award remains to be computed so long as the calcula-
tion is a mechanical duty that can be performed according to a formula.
400
B. Modiftcation of Awards by Arbitrators
Section 9 of the U.A.A. provides that, on application of a party or on
submission by a court, the arbitrator may modify an award if there was a
miscalculation or mistake in description of any person referred to in the
award or if there was some other imperfection that did not affect the merits
of the controversy.40 1 Section 9, however, leaves unresolved the question of
whether an arbitrator may modify an award on his own initiative.
The problem was addressed in Chaco Energy Co. v. Thercol Energy Co. ,402
in which the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an arbitrator may not
393. Id., 309 N.W.2d at 562.
394. See Detroit Demolition Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 50 Mich. App. 129, 130,
212 N.W.2d 827, 828 (1973), rev'don other grounds, 392 Mich. 769, 219 N.W.2d 613
(1974).
395. 107 Mich. App. at 456, 309 N.W.2d at 563.
396. Id., 309 N.W.2d at 564.
397. 101 Ill. App. 3d 83, 427 N.E.2d 1011 (1981).
398. Id at 87, 427 N.E.2d at 1014.
399. Id
400. Id See also Maine Central R.R. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 395 A.2d 1107, 1121
(Me. 1978).
401. U.A.A. § 9 (1955).
402. 97 N.M. 127, 637 P.2d 558 (1981).
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modify his award on his own initiative once it becomes final.4"' The arbi-
tration agreement in Chaco Energy required that the award be made by June
12. The arbitrators reached a decision on June 10, informed the parties by
telephone, and mailed signed copies by express mail. Chaco received its
copy on June 11 and Thercol received its on June 12. Meanwhile, the arbi-
trators decided that they had made an error in a portion of their decision.
Without reopening proceedings, an amended decision dated June 11 was
prepared and delivered to the parties on June 12.404 The lower court af-
firmed both actions, finding that (1) the first award was incomplete and
thus left the arbitrators with the power to complete the award; (2) the arbi-
trators had complete authority to modify their award until June 12; and
(3) the first award had not been delivered to the parties until after the arbi-
trators had issued the amended award and an award must be delivered to
be final.4 °5
In striking down the amended portion of the award, the supreme court
first noted the since the arbitrators had addressed all the issues presented to
them in their June 10 decision, it was complete.40 6 The question then be-
came whether the arbitrators had the power to modify that award. The
court, relying on the general rule that once an arbitrator has issued a bind-
ing award he has no power to proceed further,4 °7 said that the amended
decision was void because it was not issued for any of the reasons set forth in
section 9.408 With regard to the argument that the arbitrators had until
June 12 to make their decision and that it was therefore not final, the court
pointed out that June 12 was a limit to their authority, but that any deci-
sion made prior to that date would still bring the arbitrators under the
general rule." 9 The court stated that an agreement does not have to be
delivered to be final, interpreting section 8 to mean that an award is final
when there is a signed writing and valid if delivered within the time re-
quired by the agreement. 4 10
While the court's interpretation of section 8 is logical, it can also be
argued that section 8, taken as a whole, requires that the award be deliv-
ered before it is final. The section does not directly address that issue, but it
does provide that a signed writing must be delivered to the parties. If the
section is interpreted to mean that the award must be delivered before it is
final, the outcome of the case may have been different. A finding that the
403. Id at 130, 637 P.2d at 560.
404. Id at 129, 637 P.2d at 559.
405. Id
406. Id at 130, 637 P.2d at 560.
407. Id (citing Bayne v. Morris, 68 U.S. 97 (1863); La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S.
Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1967)).
408. 97 N.M. at 130, 637 P.2d at 560.
409. Id at 132, 637 P.2d at 561.
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award was not final would take the arbitrators out of the general rule that a
final award divests the arbitrator of his power and would allow them to
modify the award.
C. Binding EFect of an Award
The Colorado case ofJudd Construction Co. v. Evans Joint Venture411 illus-
trates the effect of section 14 of the U.A.A. 4 "2 The case involved a proceed-
ing to confirm an arbitrator's award which was consolidated with another
civil action containing several claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims. The
issue was whether it was proper to confirm an arbitrator's award prior to a
decision on the other claims in a consolidated action.41 3
The Colorado Supreme Court discussed the policies behind the U.A.A.
and noted that the purpose of arbitration is to provide for voluntary en-
forcement without undue delay or judicial interference.41 4 Section 11 pro-
vides that the court shall confirm an award unless grounds exist for
vacating that award as provided in sections 12 and 13.415 The existence of
unrelated claims in a suit was not such a ground, so the court considered
itself bound to confirm the award regardless of the pending claims.4 1 6 By
interpreting these provisions literally, the court supported the proposition
that arbitration is a distinct action which best serves its purpose with a
minimum of judicial interference.
D. Reasons for Awards
Nowhere does section 8 of the U.A.A. require arbitrators to give rea-
sons for their awards. 41 7 Illinois has adopted section 8 verbatim. 418 In
Meharry v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. ,41 the plaintiff sought damages
for lost crops pursuant to a right-of-way agreement. The dispute was sub-
mitted to arbitration and the arbitrators found for the plaintiff. The de-
fendants appealed, challenging the adequacy of the award. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that an arbitrator must only announce the award; he is
not required to set out reasons or justification for it.420 While this is suffi-
411. 642 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982).
412. U.A.A. § 14 (1955).
413. 642 P.2d at 924.
414. Id
415. U.A.A. § 11 (1955). Those grounds include fraud, corruption, partiality,
refusal by the arbitrator to hear evidence, lack of an arbitration agreement, and
decisions by the arbitrator outside the scope of his authority.
416. 642 P.2d at 925.
417. U.A.A. § 8 (1955).
418. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 108 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
419. 103 Ill. App. 3d 144, 430 N.E.2d 1138 (1981).
420. Id at 146, 430 N.E.2d at 1140. The arbitrator is, however, bound by the
conditions, limitations, and restrictions set out in the arbitration agreement. Pillott
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1048, 363 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1977).
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cient to sustain an award in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
the court pointed out that the parties could have required in their agree-
ment that the arbitrator give his reasons.4 21 In Meharry, the parties had
agreed to require a statement of facts in the award. The court found that
although the facts given were sketchy, the arbitrators had complied with
the requirement.4 22
In Maine State Employees Association v. State Department of Defense,423 a dis-
pute arose between the department and the union. The union claimed that
the department had violated the collective bargaining agreement by hiring
an applicant who was not a member of the bargaining unit, when qualified
members had applied. The dispute went to arbitration and the arbitrators
424found for the department. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court noted that its role was "to review the award of the arbitrator and not,
necessarily, to search the arbitrator's opinion for faulty reasoning. '4 25 Thus,
an award may be sustained if made to the proper party even if the reason-
ing was faulty. Quoting from Enterprise Wheel,426 the court went on to say
that an arbitrator is not- required to give his reasons for the award, and if he
does, they are not required to be unambiguous.4 27 This position is
grounded in the court's concern that if opinions given must be clear, arbi-
trators would be encouraged to "play it safe" and not write supporting
opinions.4 2' The court pointed out that opinions are valuable in construing
the agreement and in bolstering "confidence in the integrity of the pro-
cess."
4 2 9 In another case, Lisbon School Committee v. Lisbon Educational Associa-
tion ,430 the same court emphasized that it is not necessary for an arbitrator
to explain his reasoning with respect to his selection of remedy.
4 3 t
VII. FEES AND EXPENSES
Under the U.A.A., attorneys' fees incurred in the arbitration of a dis-
pute cannot be granted in the award unless the parties specifically provided
for them in the arbitration agreement. 4 2 In certain circumstances, how-
421. 103 Ill. App. 3d at 147, 430 N.E.2d at 1140.
422. Id
423. 436 A.2d 394 (Me. 1981).
424. Id at 395.
425. Id at 398. Maine has adopted verbatim the provisions of U.A.A. § 8
(1955). See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5934 (1980).
426. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960).
427. 436 A.2d at 398 n.3.
428. Id
429. Id
430. 438 A.2d 239 (Me. 1981).
431. Id at 244.
432. "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators'
expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counselfees, incurred in
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ever, courts may allow such fees.
In Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor,"' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff could recover attor-
neys' fees for the arbitration of her sex discrimination claim. She had a
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196443' which she had
decided not to pursue after she received a favorable arbitration award. Al-
though the plaintiff was represented at the arbitration hearing by her
union's counsel under a provision of the collective bargaining agreement,
she sought remuneration for her private counsel, who had prepared the
case.43" That it was her private counsel's efforts in preparing the Title VII
action that served as a prod to the union to carry the plaintiff's grievance to
arbitration was not contested.4 36 In justifying its award of fees, the court
stated:
We are satisfied that if attorneys' fees compensating counsel for
Title VII activities are to be awarded when Title VII rights are
vindicated after a full trial in the district court, such fees for the
same activities should similarly be awarded when Title VII rights
are vindicated through other means, such as, in this case,
arbitration.43 7
The Sullivan court set out two requirements for allowing attorneys' fees
in Title VII arbitration cases. First, the plaintiff must obtain the relief
sought on the merits. Second, the circumstances under which the plaintiff
obtained the desired relief must be "causally linked" to the prosecution of
the Title VII action.4 38 A plaintiff's obtaining relief in a contemporaneous
arbitration proceeding, or a mere consultation between an attorney han-
dling the Title VII case and the attorney in charge of the arbitration, would
not., without more, justify an award of fees.439
The court's decision should encourage a higher degree of cooperation
between the attorney bringing the Title VII action and the attorney
processing the dispute through arbitration. A contrary decision would have
given private attorneys little economic incentive to assist the union attorney
in handling the arbitration.
Fees and costs can also be recovered for proceedings subsequent to the
the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award." U.A.A. § 10
(1955) (emphasis added).
433. 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716 (1982).
434. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
435. Sullivan v. Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation, 504 F. Supp. 582, 583
(E.D. Pa. 1980), vacatedsub nom. Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor, 663 F.2d
443 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716 (1982).
436. 663 F.2d at 451.
437. Id
438. Id at 452.
439. Id A dissenting judge argued that the causal link between the Title VII
action and the arbitration proceeding was too attenuated for the court to award
attorneys' fees. Id at 456 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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granting of an award. In McDaniel v. Berhaler,4 4 ° the prevailing party in an
arbitration proceeding was awarded attorneys' fees for expenses relating to,
but not directly involved with, the proceeding. In a construction contract
dispute, McDaniel, in accordance with Florida law, filed a mechanic's lien
on Berhalter's property. Since the contract had a mandatory arbitration
provision, Berhalter moved to compel arbitration."' After the proceedings
were finished, the arbitrator entered an award in McDaniel's favor.44 2 Two
months later, McDaniel requested the entry 6f a final judgment based on
the arbitration award. At the hearing, the court entered a final judgment.
It awarded McDaniel the costs of arbitration with interest but not attor-
neys' fees. At the hearing, Berhalter tendered the amount of the award but
did not pay the interest. The trial court imposed a mechanic's lien on
Berhalter's property to enforce the full award." 3
On appeal, McDaniel contended that the trial court had improperly
denied his request for attorneys' fees relating to both the arbitration pro-
ceeding and the subsequent lien. The Florida District Court of Appeal held
that since Berhalter did not tender the interest that accrued after entry of
the award, his tender was no good.444 The trial court was correct in impos-
ing the lien, and, under Florida law, McDaniel was entitled to attorneys'
fees for those services directly related to enforcement of the award.445
The court upheld the denial of attorneys' fees for expenses incurred
during arbitration, relying on section 10 of the U.A.A.4 46 But the court de-
termined that McDaniel, in addition to recovering attorneys' fees for the
enforcement of the arbitration award, could recover costs incurred in the
proceeding brought to seek judicial confirmation of the arbitration
award.447 The court relied on section 14 of the U.A.A., which permits costs
of the application to the court "and proceedings subsequent thereto" to be
awarded when the court confirms, modifies, or corrects an award.44 8
VIII. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
Confirmation and vacation of arbitration awards are two sides of the
same coin. When one party objects to an award, the other may have to go
to court to have the award confirmed. The objecting party likely will peti-
440. 405 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
441. Id at 1028. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.03 (West Gum. Supp. 1983). Cf
U.A.A. § 2 (1955).
442. 405 So. 2d at 1028.
443. Id at 1029.
444. Id.
445. Id at 1030.
446. Id at 1029-31. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.11 (West Gum. Supp. 1983);
U.A.A. § 10 (1955). For the text of § 10, see note 432 supra.
447. 405 So. 2d at 1031.
448. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.15 (West Gum. Supp. 1983); U.A.A. § 14 (1955).
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tion the court to vacate the award. The focus in each case is on whether the
award is proper.
A. Confirmation
The U.A.A. provides that, upon application by a party, an arbitration
award shall be confirmed by the court unless a party presents grounds for
vacating or modifying the award.4 49 Once the court grants an order con-
firming the arbitration award, the act provides that a judgment shall be
issued in conformity with the order and it shall be enforced in the same
manner as any other judgment or decree.45 0
Courts ordinarily will not disturb an award based on an issue properly
submitted to arbitration.4 5' The award must be rationally derived from the
arbitration agreement and may be overturned where the arbitrator exhibits
a manifest disregard of the agreement. 452 Other courts hold that the test for
an improper award is whether all reasonable minds would agree that the
award was impossible under a fair interpretation of the agreement.
453
Recent decisions indicate strict judicial adherence to the confirmation
and judgment provisions of the U.A.A. and an unwillingness to become
involved in overruling arbitrators on the merits.45 4 InJudd Construction Co. v.
Evans Joint Venture,4 55 the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the limited
role of a court in considering an arbitrator's award:
[T]he issues before a court in a confirmation proceeding are lim-
449. "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an award, unless
within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modi-
fying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in
Sections 12 and 13." U.A.A. § 11 (1955).
450. Id § 14.
451. See, e.g., Gaddis Mining Co. v. Continental Materials Corp., 196 F. Supp.
860, 863-64 (D. Wyo. 1961).
452. See, e.g., Maine School Adm'rs Dist. No. 52 v. Tri Town Teachers' Ass'n,
412 A.2d 990, 994 (Me. 1980).
453. See, e.g., Maine State Employees Ass'n v. State Department of Defense, 436
A.2d 394, 398 (Me. 1981); Westbrook School Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers' Ass'n,
404 A.2d 204, 209 (Me. 1979).
454. In reviewing arbitration proceedings, courts have drawn a distinction be-
tween arbitration of commercial and labor disputes:
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here
[a labor dispute] arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since
arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration
under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts
toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here. For arbi-
tration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572 (1960).
455. 642 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982).
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ited to a consideration of whether grounds exist to vacate, modify,
or correct the award under the provisions of the Arbitration Act.
In the absence of such grounds, the language of the Arbitration
Act is mandatory: "the court shall confirm" the award.45 6
The arbitrator's decision was a final decision on the merits. "An arbitration
award is tantamount to a judgment," said the court, "and the arbitrator is
the final judge of both fact and law." '4 57
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the finality of an
arbitrator's award in Simmons v. Gof Course Specialists, Inc. 45 The con-
tracting parties had specified that, on all claims submitted to arbitration,
the decision of the arbitrator would be a condition precedent to any right to
legal action. The parties submitted a dispute to arbitration, and the de-
fendant won. The plaintiff then filed suit against the defendant.45 9 The
trial court confirmed the arbitration award and entered summary judgment
for the defendant in the amount of the award. The supreme court
affirmed.46
The court relied on the Michigan Supreme Court's prior holding in
FJ. Siller & Co. v. City of Hart,461 which involved an arbitration clause simi-
lar to that in Simmons. The Siller court had interpreted the condition prece-
dent language to preclude court action regarding disputes within the scope
of the arbitration clause but independent of the award.4 62 The court held
that "[h]aving agreed to arbitrate, plaintiff's remedy, if any, is limited to a
challenge to the validity of the arbitration award; it may not contest ab
initio in a court the merits of a contract dispute.
463
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in a
divorce case. The court, in Crutchley v. Crutchley,46" held that a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate the issue of spousal support should be given the same
effect as an agreement between the spouses setting forth the amount of such
support.46 5 The court noted that in North Carolina a valid separation
agreement will bar a subsequent action for alimony4 66 and decided that an
arbitrator's award of spousal support should achieve the same finality as a
461separation agreement.
456. Id at 925 (quoting U.A.A. § 11 (1955)) (emphasis added by the court).
The text of § 11 is reprinted in note 449 supra.
457. 642 P.2d at 925.
458. 109 Mich. App. 10, 310 N.W.2d 891 (1981).
459. Id. at 11, 310 N.W.2d at 892.
460. Id at 14, 310 N.W.2d at 893.
461. 400 Mich. 578, 255 N.W.2d 347 (1977).
462. Id at 582, 255 N.W.2d at 351.
463. Id
464. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981), review granted, 304 N.C. 725, 287
S.E.2d 900 (1982).
465. Id at 740, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
466. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(b) (1976).
467. 53 N.C. App. at 740, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
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These cases illustrate the usual strict construction of the confirmation
and judgment sections of the U.A.A. They emphasize the finality of the
arbitrator's award and the reduced role of the trial court when an issue is
submitted to arbitration.
B. Vacation
A party who is dissatisfied with an arbitration award may ask the court
to set it aside. The U.A.A. lists five grounds for vacating awards.468 Much
of the current case law indicates that those five grounds will be construed
narrowly, although the grounds for vacating an award can be expanded if
the agreement so provides. The substantive merit of a claim, however, does
not guarantee that a court will vacate the award. There are procedural
rules that must be complied with, and failure to do so can result in the
waiver of the claim.
1. Exceeding the Arbitrator's Authority
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 100 v. Citizens Gas
& Coke Utility,469 a job description in the parties' contract required that
applicants for certain positions have high school diplomas. An applicant
passed over because he lacked a diploma filed a grievance that the union
took to arbitration. 7 ° During the proceedings, the union did not challenge
the diploma requirement; it claimed instead that the utility had violated
the collective bargaining agreement by not filling a job vacancy with a
qualified senior applicant. Nevertheless, the arbitrator found that the di-
ploma requirement was unreasonable and ordered the utility to give the job
468. The grounds are specified in U.A.A. § 12 (1955):
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award
where:
(1) The award wa.s procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions
of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not ad-
versely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but
the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to con-
firm the award.
469. - Ind. App. -, 428 N.E.2d 1320 (1981).
470. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1321-22.
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to the applicant.47" ' The trial court granted the utility's motion to vacate
the award, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.4 72
The appellate court explained that a court cannot vacate an award on
the sole ground that the award was arbitrary, capricious, or against the
weight of the evidence. The issue is whether the arbitrator exceeded his
discretion.4 7 Indiana's version of the U.A.A. provides that "the court shall
vacate an award where . .. the arbitrators .. . [exceeded] their powers
and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the deci-
sion." '474 The arbitrator's powers are determined by the arbitration agree-
ment, however, so an award that does not conform to the agreement may be
set aside. 5 The court held that the arbitrator exceeded his discretion by
not following the collective bargaining agreement's job requirements.47 6
Since the union did not challenge the diploma requirement, the only issue
before the arbitrator was whether the grievant had a diploma. Since the
grievant did not, he was not qualified for the job, and the arbitrator abused
his discretion in awarding it to him.4 77
2. Refusal to Hear Evidence
Parties may also challenge awards on the ground that the arbitrators
refused to hear material evidence.4 78 In Malibu Pools of New Mexico, Inc. v.
Harvard,4 79 a contractor moved to vacate an arbitration award because the
arbitrator had refused to hear evidence material to the dispute. The trial
court decided the case on a procedural ground and refused to address the
merits. 4s° In reversing the lower court on the procedural issue, the New
Mexico Supreme Court noted in passing that in setting aside an award a
court may consider extrinsic evidence that is relevant and material to the
dispute. If the arbitrator failed to consider the extrinsic evidence, the
award may be vacated.4"'
3. Bias and Prejudice
In Evans Electrical Construction Co. v. University of Kansas Medical Center,4" 2
the Kansas Supreme Court refused to vacate an arbitration award where
471. Id at - 428 N.E.2d at 1323.
472. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1327.
473. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1326.
474. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-13 (Burns 1973). Cf U.A.A. § 12(a)(3) (1955).
475. - Ind. App. at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1326.
476. Id at -, 428 N.E.2d at 1327.
477. Id
478. U.A.A. § 12(a) (4) (1955). For the text of this provision, see note 468 supra.
479. 97 N.M. 106, 637 P.2d 537 (1981).
480. Id at 107, 637 P.2d at 537-38. For a discussion of the procedural issue in
the case, see Part IX.A infra.
481. 97 N.M. at 108, 637 P.2d at 538-39.
482. 230 Kan. 298, 634 P.2d 1079 (1981).
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the aggrieved party, a contractor, contended that the disparity between the
amount claimed and the amount awarded indicated that the arbitrators
were guilty as a matter of law of fraud, bias, partiality, and prejudice. 48 3
The contractor and the state entered into a contract which provided that
the contractor would perform electrical work on a new building. The con-
tract stated that all disputes arising out of the contract were to be resolved
by arbitration. A dispute arose, and the contractor filed a claim alleging
that it was owed an extra $333,396 above the contract price for additional
work performed. Following a hearing, the arbitrators awarded the contrac-
tor $24,342.484
The contractor filed an action to vacate the award,485 arguing that the
gross inadequacy of the award was intrinsic evidence of fraud, bias, partial-
ity, and prejudice. The supreme court rejected that claim because the con-
tractor provided no other evidence that the arbitrators were biased or
prejudiced.48 " The court concluded that a mere disparity between the
amount claimed and the amount awarded provides no basis for setting
aside an arbitrator's award.48 7
In Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace,4"' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit held that the similarity of clients between a
neutral arbitrator and a law firm representing one of the parties to the arbi-
tration was not enough to vacate the award on the ground of partiality.
48 9
Grace had entered into a series of leases with Santa Fe. Each lease provided
that any disputes between the parties were to be referred to arbitration,
each party selecting one arbitrator and the American Arbitration Associa-
tion selecting a neutral third arbitrator. A dispute arose, and the arbitra-
tion panel entered an award in favor of Santa Fe.
4 90
Grace filed an action to vacate the arbitration award,4 9 1 contending
that the neutral arbitrator was partial to Santa Fe since he and the law firm
representing Santa Fe had similar clients.49 2 The court denied the claim,
stating that to set aside an arbitration award, evidence of bias must be di-
rect, definite, and capable of demonstration.4 93 The court concluded that
483. Id at 299, 634 P.2d at 1081.
484. Id at 302, 634 P.2d at 1083.
485. The motion was brought under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (Cum. Supp.
1982), which is identical to U.A.A § 12 (1955). For the text of this provision, see
note 468 supia.
486. 230 Kan. at 306, 634 P.2d at 1087.
487. Id
488. 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1982).
489. Id at 1150-51.
490. Id at 1144.
491. The motion was brought under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12(A)(2) (1978),
which is identical to U.A.A. § 12(a)(2) (1955). For the text of this provision, see
note 468 supra.
492. 668 F.2d at 1149-50.
493. Id at 1150.
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potential neutral arbitrators cannot be expected to cut all ties with the busi-
ness world and the law does not require them to do so.
49 4
In Commonwealth v. Holt Hauling and Warehousing Systems,495 the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court held that an arbitration award was prop-
erly vacated where the arbitrator previously had been involved with a party
to the arbitration hearing.49 6 The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board had
entered into a contract with Holt which provided that Holt would perform
certain services for the Board. A dispute arose and was referred to an arbi-
trator, the deputy attorney general. The arbitrator found in favor of the
Board and Holt brought an action under the Arbitration Act of 1927497 to
vacate the award on the ground of partiality.
Holt claimed that since the deputy attorney general appointed as arbi-
trator had approved the contract at issue in his capacity as counsel for the
Board, the award should be vacated.4 9 The court upheld the lower court's
vacation of the award, stating that a party to an arbitration proceeding is
entitled to a full and fair hearing, conducted by an arbitrator who is not
involved with a party to the proceeding.
4 99
C. Procedural Problems
A motion to vacate an award may be denied even if it has substantive
merit. The U.A.A. limits not only the grounds for setting aside awards, but
the manner in which the claim can be asserted.5"'
494. Id at 1150-51.
495. - Pa. Commw. -, 440 A.2d 707 (1982).
496. Id at -, 440 A.2d at 708.
497. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 170(b) (Purdon 1963), provided that "the court
shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration. . . where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the
arbitrators, or any of them." Pennsylvania adopted the U.A.A. in 1980. See Part
I.B supra.
498. - Pa. Commw. at -, 440 A.2d at 708.
499. Id
500. U.A.A. § 12(c) (1955) provides:
An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days
after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predi-
cated upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made
within ninety days after such grounds are known or should have been
known.
In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of
Subsection (a) the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators cho-
sen as provided in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in
accordance with Section 3, or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth
in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court may order a rehearing
before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed
in accordance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement re-
[Vol. 48
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In Monmouth School Committee v. Huton,"' the parties submitted a labor
dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator did not send notice of the award un-
til forty-four months after the hearing was completed. The plaintiff moved
to vacate the award on the ground that it was untimely.5 °2 The Maine
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had waived its objection to the
lateness of the award by failing to make a claim in writing before the deliv-
ery of the award, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.5 ° 3
Maine's arbitration act provides that a court "shall vacate an award
where. . . [t]he award was not made within the time fixed therefor by the
agreement . . . and the party has not waived the objection., 50 4 The arbi-
tration agreement in Huston required that the award be made within thirty
days after the hearing. Nonetheless, the court held that even a late award
may not be set aside unless it is objected to in a timely fashion. 50 5 The
statute provided that a party waives his objection to the delay "unless he
notifies the arbitrators of his objection prior to the delivery of the award to
him." 6 The actual arbitration agreement in Huston, in fact, went even
further: it required a written objection. Based on this provision, the court
upheld the finding of waiver.50 7 A party who fails to comply with the
waiver rules waives what otherwise may be a valid claim. The rules, said
the court, discourage delay because otherwise a party might not object to
the delay until he learned that the award was unfavorable.
50 8
An objection framed as a request for clarification rather than a motion
to vacate will not circumvent the time limits for setting aside awards. In
Downing v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,5o9 the plaintiff submitted an insurance
claim to arbitration. The claim was denied on April 26. The plaintiff re-
quested a clarification of the award nineteen days later. The arbitrators
clarified the award on August 23, stating that the plaintiff had failed to
present sufficient evidence. The plaintiff requested that the arbitrators reo-
pen the proofs and then filed a similar request in the circuit court.5" The
quires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and com-
mences from the date of the order.
See also id § 8(b).
501. 437 A.2d 621 (Me. 1981).
502. Id at 622.
503. Id at 623.
504. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5934 (1980).
505. 437 A.2d at 623.
506. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5934 (1980).
507. 437 A.2d at 623.
508. Id
509. 113 Mich. App. 96, 317 N.W.2d 302 (1982).
510. Id at 99, 317 N.W.2d at 304. Michigan General Court Rule 769.9(2) pro-
vides that an application to vacate an arbitration award must be filed with the
court within 20 days after "delivery of a copy of the award to the plaintiff." MIcfi.
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court treated the request as a motion to set aside the award and denied it as
untimely. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that since the
U.A.A. does not authorize requests for clarification of awards, such requests
cannot toll the filing deadline.5 ' The court noted in dicta that motions for
confirmation filed by the victorious party also do not extend the deadline
for the aggrieved party to file a motion to set aside the award.5 1
2. Failure to Make a Record of the Hearing
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Malibu Pools of New Mexico, Inc. v.
Harvard,5" 3 held that a party's waiver of the right to have a record made of
the arbitration hearing does not preclude that party from attacking the de-
cision."' Malibu performed certain services in the construction of a swim-
ming pool and garden room at the Harvard residence. A dispute between
the parties arose and Malibu filed a claim which was referred to arbitration.
The arbitrators found in favor of the Harvards. Neither party had re-
quested that a record be made. Malibu filed an action to vacate the
award.51 5 The lower court denied the claim on the ground that no record
was made of the hearing. The supreme court reversed, basing its decision
on the fact that there were no provisions in the New Mexico arbitration act
that expressly precluded a party from asserting a claim where no record of
the hearing was made.516 The court concluded that the case should be re-
manded to the trial court to determine whether the award should be va-
cated on the ground that the arbitrator failed to hear material evidence. 5
17
IX. APPEALS
Since one of the purposes of arbitration is to minimize the time and
expense of adjudicating a dispute, appeals are generally not favored by
courts.51 ' The U.A.A. does allow appeals in certain circumstances, how-
ever.5" 9 Not surprisingly, the right to appeal in arbitration is often nar-
rower than the corresponding right to appeal from court judgments. Yet
GEN. CT. R. 769.9(2) (1963). Although the plaintiff admitted her motion was not
timely, she contended that her request for clarification tolled the twenty day limit.
113 Mich. App. at 99, 317 N.W.2d at 304.
511. 113 Mich. App. at 100, 317 N.W.2d at 305.
512. Id at 101, 317 N.W.2d at 306.
513. 97 N.M. 106, 637 P.2d 537 (1981).
514. Id at -, 637 P.2d at 538.
515. Id The motion was filed under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12(A)(4) (1978),
which is identical to U.A.A. § 12(a)(4) (1955). For the text of this provision, see
note 468 supra.
516. 97 N.M. at -, 637 P.2d at 538.
517. Id at -, 637 P.2d at 539.
518. See, e.g., Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 289, 297 A.2d 244, 246 (1972).
519. U.A.A. § 19 (1955) provides:
[Vol. 48
56
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/11
UNIFORM ARBITRA TION ACT
recent cases also have held that under the U.A.A. the right to appeal can be
even broader than it is when a judgment is involved.
A. Timing and Procedure for Appeals
Some recent decisions indicate that an appeal from arbitration requires
fewer procedural formalities than an appeal from a judicial proceeding.
New Mexico courts, for example, have held that a trial transcript is a pre-
requisite to an appeal from any judicial act that the transcript would have
reflected.52 ° But there is a different rule for arbitration cases. In Malibu
Pools of New Mexico, Inc. v. Harvard,5 2 ' the New Mexico Supreme Court rea-
soned that a record is discretionary in the arbitral proceeding; the U.A.A.
provisions that govern appeals do not specifically mention a record as a
prerequisite to an appeal.5 22 Accordingly, the court held that failure to
present a transcript to the court does not affect the right to appeal.52 3
The stage of the proceedings from which an appeal can be taken is
restricted. While a final judgment is usually required for appeals from judi-
cial proceedings, the U.A.A. allows appeals in certain situations even
though the arbitrator is required to proceed further.52 4 The Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in School Board v. Comelison,525 held that an appeal is
proper from an arbitral decision that reserved calculation of back pay for a
later date.526 The court allowed the appeal even though the arbitrator ar-
guably had not fully disposed of the case, relying on an earlier Florida case,
State v. Pearson,527 which authorized appeals under the U.A.A. from any
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made
under Section 2;
(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made
under Section 2(b);
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this
act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as
from orders or judgments in a civil action.
520. State ex rel State Highway Comm'n v. Sherman, 82 N.M. 316, 317, 481
P.2d 104, 109 (1971).
521. 97 N.M. 106, 637 P.2d 537 (1981).
522. Id at -, 637 P.2d at 538. See U.A.A. § 19 (1955). For the text of this
provision, see note 519 supra.
523. 97 N.M. at -, 637 P.2d at 538 (citing Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town
of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 220, 405 A.2d 393, 399 (1979)).
524. U.A.A. § 19 (1955). For the text of this provision, see note 519 supra.
525. 406 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
526. Id at 485.
527. 154 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
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order made by the arbitrator.52 The Pearson court reasoned that the ordi-
nary final judgment rule does not apply because the avenue of appeal in
arbitration proceedings is created by statute.529
In Maine Central Railroad v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad,53 the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court reached a similar conclusion. The arbitrator in
that case had found against the plaintiff on the merits after it refused to
submit to arbitration. The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court based
on a claim related to the arbitration. The defendant moved to confirm the
original arbitration award and subsequently appealed the court's non-con-
firmation order under a Maine statute that allowed appeals from "an order
confirming or denying an award." '' The plaintiff argued that the refusal
to confirm could not be appealed because the arbitrator's order was not
final, in that the plaintiff's suit was still pending. 53 2
The court acknowledged that denial of confirmation of an award is not
a final judgment. Drawing on cases from other jurisdictions which have
adopted the U.A.A., the court found an immediate right to appeal from an
arbitral order "irrespective of the interlocutory nature of the decree." 533
The court based its ruling in part on the absence of any statute purporting
to encompass all exceptions to the final judgment rule.53 4
B. Standard of Review
Assuming that an appeal is proper, the issue becomes what standard
the court should apply in determining whether the arbitrator acted prop-
erly. The scope of review permitted an appellate court is usually even more
restricted than that given to the trial court; it is limited to determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion.5 35
In Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace,53 6 the arbitrator found that Grace
had forfeited his lease interests to Santa Fe. Grace moved to have the deci-
sion vacated on the grounds of refusal to hear evidence and partiality. '7
528. Id. at 835.
529. I1d at 836.
530. 395 A.2d 1107 (Me. 1978).
531. See U.A.A. § 19(a)(3) (1955).
532. 395A.2dat 1113.
533. Id. The court relied on Roeder v. Huish, 105 Ariz. 508, 467 P.2d 902
(1970); Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 297 A.2d 244 (1972); School Comm. v.
Agawam Educ. Ass'n, 371 Mass. 845, 359 N.E.2d 956 (1977); United Ass'n of Jour-
neymen & Apprentices of Plumbing v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 103, 412
P.2d 352 (1966).
534. 395 A.2dat 1113.
535. See Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d
116, 118 (7th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Swanson, 95 Mich. App. 36, 39, 289 N.W.2d 875,
877 (1980).
536. 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1982).
537. Id at 1144.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit deferred to the
arbitrator's judgment: "Courts are, expectedly, justified in exercising great
caution when asked to set aside an arbitration award, which is the product
of the theoretically informal, speedy, and inexpensive process of arbitration,
freely chosen by the parties."
53 8
A recent Maine case also advocates a narrow scope of review. In Maine
State Employees Association v. State, 5 9 the state and the union had entered
into a collective bargaining agreement providing preference to existing em-
ployees for new positions. When the state passed over an existing employee
for a job, the union sought arbitration. The arbitrator found that the
agreement did not require that current employees be hired for new posi-
tions. The union moved to vacate the award on the theory that, properly
construed, the agreement did require the hiring of current employees.
5 40
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court sustained the award,
stresging that a very limited standard of review is appropriate.54 1 An arbi-
tral decision should be upheld, said the court, so long as a rational arbitra-
tor could construe the contract to support the award. The court found that
the facts supported this "rationally grounded" standard of review.
542
X. THE COURT'S AUTHORITY
A. Jurisdiction
According to the U.A.A., making an agreement that provides for arbi-
tration confers jurisdiction on the courts of that state to enforce the agree-
ment and to enter judgment on an arbitration award.5 43 Courts may also
exercise authority in certain other situations such as proceedings to compel
or stay arbitration,5" the appointment of arbitrators,54 5 the confirmation of
an award,546 and the vacation, modification, or correction of an award.54 7
Arbitration agreements can limit the court's authority because the ob-
ject of arbitration is to avoid the formalities, delays, and expense of litiga-
tion.5 4  Although the U.A.A. approach seems straightforward, case law has
interpreted the courts' jurisdiction both narrowly and expansively.
In Dawn v. Mecom," ' a Colorado federal district court gave a broad
538. Id at 1147.
539. 436 A.2d 394 (Me. 1981).
540. Id at 396.
541. Id at 397.
542. Id
543. U.A.A. § 17 (1955).
544. Id § 2.
545. Id § 3.
546. Id § 11.
547. Id §§ 12, 13.
548. Seither & Cherry Co. v. Illinois Bank Building Corp., 95 Ill. App. 3d 191,
195, 419 N.E.2d 940, 944 (1981).
549. 520 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Colo. 1981).
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reading to its jurisdictional authority. The issue was whether federal court
jurisdiction in a diversity action to confirm an arbitration award was pre-
cluded by a previous declaratory judgment action filed by one of the parties
in state court.550 The defendant contended that the federal court's jurisdic-
tion was precluded by the state court's previous assumption of
jurisdiction. 55 1
The federal court characterized its jurisdiction as concurrent with the
state court and stated that neither resjudicata nor abstention barred resolu-
tion of the action.552 After weighing the desirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation, the stage to which the state proceedings had progressed, and the
potential prejudice to the parties, the court felt a "virtually unflagging obli-
gation" to exercise its jurisdiction.55 3 It determined that the defendant's
motion for a temporary restraining order against the arbitration proceed-
ings did not give the state court jurisdiction, noting that under Colorado
law a valid and unwaived arbitration clause deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction until the matter is submitted to arbitration.5 54
Interestingly, the Dawn court determined that it had jurisdiction to
confirm the arbitration award without a single reference to the U.A.A. The
case suggests that if a suit contains an arbitration issue a court will not
acquire jurisdiction over the issue until it passes on the merits of a dispute
related to the arbitration. At least where diversity jurisdiction requirements
are met, federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in ar-
bitration proceedings.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Stephanie's v. Ultracashmere House, Lid ,"
was faced with a similar jurisdictional question and based its decision
squarely on the provisions of the U.A.A.556 The case involved an appeal
from an Illinois circuit court order vacating an arbitration award entered in
550. The matter was before the court on the defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matterjurisdiction. Id at 1195. The defendant had originally filed a
complaint in state court seeking a declaratory judgment to construe an arbitration
agreement and a temporary restraining order against the plaintiff's arbitration pro-
ceeding. The state court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and
stayed further judicial proceedings pending arbitration. Id. at 1196. When the ar-
bitration panel issued its award, the plaintiff filed in federal district court for confir-
mation of the award and for a declaratory judgment of dissolution, accounting, and
winding up a joint venture. Id.
551. Id
552. Id
553. Id at 1196-97.
554. Id at 1197-98. The conclusion was based on a finding that the state court
did not have the proceedings subjudice at the time of the plaintiff's petition to con-
firm the arbitration award since the state court had not actually passed on the
merits of a dispute relating to arbitration.
555. 98 Ill. App. 3d 654, 424 N.E.2d 979 (1981).
556. Id at 656, 424 N.E.2d at 980.
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New York under the New York arbitration statute.5 57 The supreme court
held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the U.A.A. to determine
the merits of the petition and vacate the unconfirmed New York award.55
The court found that the U.A.A. "confers upon Illinois courts the
power to enter a judgment on an award under the Act" but reasoned that
because no award was made under the Illinois statute, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction to act on the New York award.5 5 9 The court in
Stephanie's found no obligation to give full faith and credit to the award
because it had not been confirmed by a New York court.5 6 Under the
Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation, the extent of a court's jurisdiction
should be determined solely by looking at the U.A.A.5 6'
B. Injunctions and Stays of Arbitration
In Lester Witte & Co. v. Lundy,56 the Illinois Appellate Court faced the
issue of the trial court's authority to enter a temporary restraining order to
enjoin an arbitration proceeding. The plaintiff in Lundy moved to stay arbi-
tration proceedings brought by the defendant on the ground that the de-
fendant's demand for arbitration did not state an arbitrable claim. The
trial court entered a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proceedings
and scheduled a preliminary hearing to determine the arbitrability of the
dispute.5 6
3
The appellate court held that a court does not have the authority to
issue a temporary restraining order and provide for a preliminary hearing
where the arbitration agreement is clear in its requirement for arbitration of
the dispute.56 4 The court cited section 2(b) of the U.A.A., which provides:
On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agree-
ment to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona
fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay
ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposin
party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
Because there was no substantial and bona fide dispute as to the arbitration
557. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980). Confirmation of
the award was pending before a New York trial court at the time the Illinois circuit
case was filed.
558. 98 Ill. App. 3d at 655-56, 424 N.E.2d at 980. Illinois's version of the U.A.A.
is found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-123 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Cum. Supp.
1982-1983).
559. 98 Ill. App. 3d at 655-56, 424 N.E.2d at 980.
560. Id at 656, 424 N.E.2d at 980.
561. Id
562. 98 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 425 N.E.2d 1 (1981).
563. Id at 1102, 425 N.E.2d at 2.
564. Id at 1104, 425 N.E.2d at 4.
565. U.A.A. § 2(b) (1955). Illinois incorporated this section into ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 10, § 102(b) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
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agreement, the court held that the lower court had no authority to grant
the temporary restraining order or to schedule any hearings on the issue. '
In City of Hot Springs v. Gundersonsrs, Inc. ,567 the South Dakota Supreme
Court considered the authority of a court to stay an arbitration proceeding
when one co-defendant is subject to an arbitration agreement but the other
co-defendant is not. The plaintiff had hired Phelps-Benz to design a golf
course and had contracted with Gunderson's to construct it. The plaintiff's
contract with Gunderson called for compulsory arbitration of disputes,
while the contract with Phelps-Benz did not. '68 After a dispute arose, the
plaintiff sued both Gunderson and Phelps-Benz, alleging that they were
jointly and severally liable for negligent design and construction of the irri-
gation system. Gunderson moved to compel arbitration. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that Phelps-Benz was not a party and
there would be a duplication if arbitration and judicial proceedings were
going on at the same time on the same issues.5 69
The supreme court reversed, basing its decision on section 2 of the
U.A.A., which the court said required the trial court to consider severing
the claim against Gunderson from the claim against Phelps-Benz. 5 70 Since
the trial court did not consider separating the claims and based its decision
on the fear of multiple suits, it had no authority to deny the motion to
compel arbitration.5 7 '
C. Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fees
The issue in Heyman v. Voneli 5 72 was whether the trial court could in-
566. 98 Ill. App. 3d at 1104, 425 N.E.2d at 3-4.
567. 322 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1982).
568. Id at 9.
569. Id
570. Id at 11. The relevant portions of U.A.A. § 2 (1955) provide:
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in
Section 1, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the Court shall
order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the Court shall proceed
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbi-
tration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be
denied.
(d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitra-
tion shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor
has been made under this Section or, f the issue is severable, the stay may be
with respect thereto ony. When the application is made in such action or
proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
(Emphasis added.) South Dakota incorporated these provisions in S.D. COMI,.
LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-5, -7 (1971).
571. 322 N.W.2d at 11.
572. 413 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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crease the amount of costs awarded in arbitration and assess attorneys' fees.
The plaintiff had made the demand for arbitration, alleging breach of a
construction contract which contained an arbitration clause. The arbitra-
tor found in the defendant's favor and an order was entered assessing arbi-
tration costs against the plaintiff.573 On the defendant's motion to confirm
the award, the court entered an order confirming the award and granting
attorneys' fees and costs for the circuit court litigation. The Florida District
Court of Appeal held that the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs
was improper based on Florida's version of the U.A.A. 574 Under Florida
law, a court, upon application to confirm an award, is without authority to
vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award unless it was procured by
undue means or mistake.
5 75
The statements of the Florida court in Heyman should be contrasted
with the holding of another panel of the Florida District Court of Appeal in
McDaniel v. Berhalter , 7' a case that involved the enforcement of an arbitra-
tion award. The questions before the court were whether a party could
shift the burden of attorneys' fees in arbitration by filing a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action and whether the trial court could add arbitration costs
and pre-award interest to an arbitration award.57 7 The McDaniel court
cited an earlier Florida case, Mills v. Robert W. Gotifried, Inc. ,578 which held
that an arbitration award could be enforced by means of a mechanic's
lien. 579 However, the McDaniel court observed that the mere institution of
a mechanic's lien foreclosure action does not operate to change a party's
rights under the U.A.A °8 0 According to McDaniel, the use of a mechanic's
lien to enforce an arbitration award does not avoid the Florida rule that
attorneys' fees associated with arbitration proceedings are not recoverable
in the absence of an agreement between the parties.58 ' The prevailing
party could not recover attorneys' fees for services in arbitration.5 82
573. Id at 1255.
574. Id See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
575. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.13-.14 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); U.A.A. §§ 12, 13
(1955). The court also cited the provision that specifically excludes attorneys' fees
as recoverable costs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); U.A.A.
§ 10 (1955). The defendant, however, sought to recover his attorneys' fees and costs
under the mechanic's lien statute, not the U.A.A. The court rejected the claim
because an award for costs and fees cannot be based on proceedings in two forums.
413 So. 2d at 1255. The court decided that "a party who enters into a contract
requiring arbitration may not file a complaint of foreclosure and demand an attor-
ney's fee." Id
576. 405 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
577. Id at 1028.
578. 272 So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
579. Id at 839.
580. 405 So. 2d at 1029.
581. Id at 1029-30.
582. Id at 1030. The court in McDaniel concluded it was proper for the trial
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The plaintiff had also argued that the trial court's interest award
should be considered as a permissible modification of the arbitrator's
avard. The appellate court dismissed this argument since the trial record
did not reveal that the plaintiff had sought a modification and no facts in
the record supported a modification. 583 The court emphasized that modifi-
cation is proper under the U.A.A. only when there is an evident miscalcula-
tion of figures, an evident mistake in description, or the award is imperfect
as a matter of form.58 4 Since the arbitrator could have awarded costs but
did not, the court held that the lump sum award barred the plaintiff from
seeking arbitration costs in addition to the award.5"'
D. Remand to Original Arbitrators
In Meharry v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. ,586 the Appellate Court of
Illinois was presented with the issue of a court's authority to remand a dis-
pute to the same panel of arbitrators whose original award was vacated by
the court. The lower court vacated the original award because the panel
had made a gross mistake of fact and had exceeded its authority in making
the award and remanded the case to the original arbitrators. This remand
was appealed on the ground that the lower court lacked authority to do
SO.5
8 7
The appellate court relied on section 12(c) of the U.A.A., which per-
mits submission of the dispute to a new panel of arbitrators in certain cir-
cumstances.5 8 The court found that section 12(c) does not require the court
to appoint new arbitrators, and so the lower court was within its authority
court to impose a lien on the defendant's property and that the plaintiff could re-
cover attorneys' fees related to enforcing the arbitration award. Id This followed
because the defendant failed to pay interest when he paid the award, and "[s]ince
the tender was not the full amount due, it was not a good tender." Id
583. Id
584. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.14 (West Gum. Supp. 1983); U.A.A. § 13 (1955).
585. 405 So. 2d at 1031. The bar did not extend to the costs of seeking judicial
confirmation of the award because those are specifically recoverable under FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 682.15 (West Cum. Supp. 1983). The section is the same as U.A.A.
§ 14 (1955).
586. 103 Ill. App. 3d 144, 430 N.E.2d 1138 (1981).
587. Id at 145, 430 N.E.2d at 1139.
588. U.A.A. § 12(c) (1955) provides:
In vacating the award on grounds other than. .. [that there was no arbi-
tration agreement] the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators
. . . , or if the award is vacated on the grounds. . . [that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority or refused to hear relevant evidence] the court
may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their
successors . . ..
The court applied this section by analogy because the Illinois law in effect at the
time did not contain it. Illinois later adopted this section. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
10, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
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to remand the case back to the original panel.5 89 A new panel must be
appointed only when the grounds for vacating the original order were
fraud, corruption, partiality, undue means, or any other grounds specifi-
cally listed in section 12(c). 590
E. Consolidation and Separation of Proceedings
A recent Maryland decision, Litton Bionetics v. Glen Construction Co. ,-
considered a court's power to order consolidation of arbitration proceed-
ings. A contractor filed a demand for arbitration against the owner of a
newly constructed building. The owner counterclaimed and filed a de-
mand for arbitration against the architect alleging negligence. The con-
tractor refused to consolidate the arbitration proceedings and the owner
sought a declaratory judgment that they be consolidated. The judgment
was denied and the owner appealed.59 2
In addressing the power to order consolidation, the Maryland Court of
Appeals first described the problem:
Inasmuch as arbitration is a matter of agreement between the par-
ties, the problem of power. . . arises only when the parties have
not provided in their agreements whether consolidation is or is not
authorized. The problem arises when there is a common party to
two or more agreements and there is a commonality of subject
matter of the dispute under the different agreements.
593
The court observed that those courts which recognize the power to order
consolidation believe that the power to enforce an arbitration agreement
includes the power to order that the arbitration be done in conjunction
with a sufficiently related arbitration.5 94 This minimizes the danger of in-
consistent results and provides convenience and economy by settling dis-
putes arising out of common facts and occurrences in one proceeding.
5 95
The court contrasted this view with that of courts which have found no
power to compel consolidation. These courts have stressed "that a court
cannot rewrite the agreement of the parties,"' 96 but they use the term "re-
write" in two senses. First, the court may feel it can do no more than en-
force what the parties have expressed in their agreement, and the
agreement is silent regarding consolidation. Second, the mechanics of
meshing an arbitration proceeding under one contract with the procedure
specified in another may not be possible without affecting the rights of one
589. 103 Ill. App. 3d at 148, 430 N.E.2d at 1141.
590. Id
591. 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981).
592. Id at-, 437 A.2d at 209-211.
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or more of the parties.59 7
After weighing the conflicting rules, the Maryland court stated that if
the contract is silent, consolidation of arbitration proceedings can be or-
dered if the issues are substantially the same and no substantial rights are
prejudiced. "98 The court decided that "the better analysis is presented in
those decisions which conclude that the power to order consolidation exists
as an incident of the jurisdiction statutorily conferred on a court generally
to enforce arbitration agreements."5 99 The court noted that, while a court
might be unable to exercise its power to order consolidation if it would alter
a party's contract rights, the power still exists. It emphasized that if consoli-
dation deprived a party of a contractual right under the arbitration agree-
ment, the exercise of the power to consolidate would be improper.60 0 The
actual considerations that determine whether a court should exercise its au-
thority to order consolidation of arbitration proceedings are: (1) the effect
of consolidation on the parties' contractual rights, and (2) the degree to




The power of a court to review an arbitration decision is limited. 32
Allowing review of arbitration decisions turns arbitrators into courts of orig-
inal jurisdiction and makes the road to final judgment longer and more
costly.603 Judicial review is thus limited to a determination of whether the
597. Id at -, 437 A.2d at 214 (citing M. DOMKE, supra note 9, at 272, 274).
598. 292 Md. at -, 437 A.2d at 217.
599. Id
600. Id at -, 437 A.2d at 218. To guide the lower court on remand, the court
stated that the same factors used in determining whether to consolidate equity ac-
tions should be used to determine whether to order consolidation of arbitration
proceedings. Id at -, 437 A.2d at 219. The court also noted that the case might be
subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). The court, how-
ever, found there would be no difference in result between the federal statute and
the U.A.A. 292 Md. at -, 437 A.2d at 219-20.
601. 292 Md. at -, 437 A.2d at 217.
602. Meharry v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 103 Ill. App. 3d 144, 146,
430 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (1981).
603. The United States Supreme Court, in a trio of cases known as the Steelwork-
ers' Trilogy, articulated another line of reasoning for judicial deference to arbitral
decisions. Parties bargain for recourse to an arbitrator in the event of disagreement,
expressing a preference for an arbitrator's judgment. Under general rules of con-
tract law the court upholds the intent of the parties and gives them what they bar-
gained for. Therefore, while a reviewing court may disagree with the decision, it
should not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. See United Steelwork-
ers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). Courts have used the same reasoning
under the U.A.A. to circumscribe the scope of review. See School Dist. v. Erie Educ.
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arbitrator acted within the authority granted him by the agreement. °4
Courts consistently uphold a reviewing court's authority to determine
whether the subject matter of the dispute is within the terms of the agree-
ment to arbitrate.6" 5 This analysis, called the "essence" test, was developed
by the United States Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp. ,606 a labor arbitration case. Recent cases-many of them from
Pennsylvania-have held that an arbitrator's decision meets the test if it is
rationally derived from the agreement in light of its language, context, and
other indicia of the parties' intent.
In School District v. Erie Education Association,6°7 the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court held that the adoption of the U.A.A. did not change the
use of the essence test.60 8 In Erie Education, the arbitrator had decided that
a revision by the school district of its sabbatical leave policy violated the
collective bargaining agreement. The district's revision placed more restric-
tions on sabbaticals and limited the number that could be taken. The col-
lective bargaining agreement stated only that "[s]abbatical leaves shall be
granted to teachers in accordance with the School Code., 60' The School
Code left to the district the right to "make such regulations as they may
deem necessary to make sure that employees on leave shall utilize such leave
properly for the purpose for which it was granted."6 ' The lower court
reversed the arbitrator on the ground that the decision could not have been
drawn from the essence of the contract. The appellate court held that the
award was consistent with the essence of the agreement and reinstated it.6"'
The court noted that broad judicial deference should be given to arbitra-
tors. 6 1 So long as the subject matter-sabbaticals in this case-is included
in the collective bargaining agreement, "the validity of the arbitrator's in-
terpretation is not a matter of concern to the court."
6 13
Ass'n, - Pa. Commw. -, -, 447 A.2d 686, 690 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Ameri-
can Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, - Pa. Commw. -, -, 444 A.2d
813, 817 (1982); Fortney v. School Dist., 108 Wis. 2d 167, 179, 321 N.W.2d 225, 232
(1982).
604. Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 521, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312
(1981).
605. Hiller v. Allstate Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. -, -, 446 A.2d 273, 274 (1982).
For a discussion of arbitrability in general, see Part IV supra.
606. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Enterprise Wheel is one of the three cases known as
the Steelworkers' Trilogy. See note 603 supra.
607. - Pa..Commw. -, 447 A.2d 686 (1982).
608. Id. at -, 447 A.2d at 690.
609. Id at -, 447 A.2d at 687.
610. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1171 (Purdon 1962).
611. - Pa. Commw. at -, 447 A.2d at 690.
612. Id at -, 447 A.2d at 689 (quoting Scranton Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1147
v. Scranton School Dist., - Pa. -, -, 444 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1982)).
613. - Pa. Commw. at -, 447 A.2d at 690 (quoting Leechburg Area School
Dist. v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 521, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312 (1981)).
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The same court discussed the same test in Board ofEducation v. AmericanFederation of State, County & Municipal Employees.6 14 Several members of the
union had been terminated by the school district in a complicated plan to
transfer collection of taxes to the city. The union filed a grievance, and the
arbitrator found that the termination was in violation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The court held that the award was within the essence
of the agreement and that the interpretation was not subject to review.6 t5
InJfa v. Shacket,61 6 the Michigan Court of Appeals reiterated the gen-
eral rule that errors of fact or misinterpretations of law are not grounds for
vacating an arbitrator's award. The court pointed out, however, that if the
parties agreed to be subject to a particular law or set of laws the court could
examine that law to determine if it was followed.6 "7 The court explained
that this seemingly broader scope of review was really the traditional exam-
ination of the award to determine if it complied with the terms of the
agreement.61 8
In Chirico v. Board of Supervisors,6 19 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court closed one avenue of an expanded scope of review by holding that a
vaguely worded award would not be interpreted by the courts but must be
returned to arbitration."' The police in Chirico brought an action to com-
pel implementation of certain provisions of an arbitrator's award, which
had dealt with vacation weeks. The police argued that they should be al-
lowed to take vacations during weeks in which they were scheduled to work
six days. The term "vacation week" was not defined in the award.6 2 ' The
court held that the lower court had no jurisdiction to interpret this term
and instructed it to remand the case to the arbitrator for interpretation." '
The court felt that allowing interpretation of arbitral awards would result
in judicial determination of issues properly belonging in the arbitration
process.6 23
In Hughes v. Yellow Freight System ,624 a grievance committee rendered a
decision against Hughes. He filed suit in court and, in order to avoid the
limitations placed on review of such decisions, contended that he was not
seeking review of the decision but was asking for relief for breach of con-
tract. He based the argument on the fact that Yellow Freight had deducted
614. - Pa. Commw. -, 444 A.2d 813 (1982).
615. Id at -, 444 A.2d at 817.
616. 114 Mich. App. 626, 319 N.W.2d 604 (1982).
617. Id at 635, 319 N.W.2d at 607. The court was considering the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
618. 114 Mich. App. at 635-36, 319 N.W.2d at 607.
619. - Pa. Commw. -, 439 A.2d 1281 (1981).
620. Id at -, 439 A.2d at 1284-85.
621. Id at - 439 A.2d at 1284.
622. Id at -- 439 A.2d at 1285.
623. Id at - 439 A.2d at 1284-85.
624. 293 Pa. Super. 423, 439 A.2d 183 (1981).
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money from his salary to cover damages he had caused prior to the griev-
ance committee decision.61' The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected this
contention, finding that "[a] labor arbitration award that is properly based
on the applicable collective bargaining agreement. . . is entitled to finality
and is not subject to review on the merits." 626
Another Pennsylvania case addressed the standard of review to be ap-
plied to an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
In Aliquippa Education Association v. School District,627 the arbitrator found
that the district had violated a savings clause in the collective bargaining
agreement by failing to grant a sabbatical leave to a teacher. The lower
court held that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in finding that the par-
ties intended to incorporate sabbatical rights into the contract. 628 The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that "[w]here an ar-
bitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement can be in any
way rationally derived from that agreement, the arbitrator's decision draws
its essence from the agreement and shall not be disturbed by a reviewing
court." 6 29 The court stated that a reviewing court may disturb the award
only where there is apparent disregard of the agreement, completely unsup-
ported by principles of contract construction.
630
In summary, in the absence of special authority granted in the agree-
ment, the powers of a court to review an award are usually limited to deter-
mining whether the award was within the scope of the contract. The court
will not determine whether that decision was right or wrong, only whether
it could rationally be derived from the agreement.
XII. TIMELINESS
The substantive rights of a party under an arbitration agreement may
be lost if they are not asserted in a timely fashion. Certain claims and de-
fenses must be asserted within the proper time period, whether that period
is set by statute or in the arbitration agreement.
A. Demand for Arbitration
The timeliness of a demand to arbitrate is not regulated by statute but
is usually provided for in the agreement between the parties. The contract
usually provides for a demand to arbitrate within a reasonable time after a
claim, dispute, or other matter in question has arisen.In Public Health Trust V .R. Ham'son Construction Corp. ,6 31 the county
625. Id at - 439 A.2d at 185.
626. Id
627. - Pa. Commw. -, 437 A.2d 1039 (1981).
628. Id at -, 437 A.2d at 1039-40.
629. Id at -, 437 A.2d at 1040-41.
630. Id at -, 437 A.2d at 1040.
631. 415 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1982).
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public health trust appealed from a trial court order denying its motion to
stay arbitration proceedings. The county contended that Harrison had not
demanded arbitration within a reasonable time after the dispute arose as
required by the contract. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the
arbitrator, not the court, should decide whether the demand for arbitration
was timely. 3 2 The court indicated that the timeliness of a demand is not a
condition precedent to arbitration but is simply a procedural stipulation
agreed to by the parties.633
The same court reached the same conclusion in Rinker Portland Cenent
Co. v. Seidel,"J where the contract in question contained no language re-
quiring a demand for arbitration or specifying that the demand be filed
within a reasonable time. The court indicated that, while the contract
might be construed to require a demand within a reasonable time, that
issue was one for the arbitrator. 13'
5
The timeliness of a demand for arbitration was decided by a federal
district court-not the arbitrator-in E C Ernst, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee.
The plaintiff sued for contractual violations. The defendant moved for an
order compelling the plaintiff to arbitrate. Fifty-one days after arbitration
was ordered, the defendant attempted to waive the contractual right to ar-
bitration it had already asserted. The plaintiff responded by asserting its
own right to arbitration. 3 7 Normally, the filing of a lawsuit to enforce a
contract is a waiver of the plaintiff's right to arbitrate, but where a defend-
ant offers to arbitrate, the plaintiff has a right to accept the arbitration
offer. ' 38 In Ernst, however, the defendant withdrew its offer to arbitrate
before the plaintiff indicated its desire to do so. The court held that the
plaintiff's decision to arbitrate was timely because (1) arbitration proceed-
ings had already begun and so there was no need to make the demand, and
(2) the plaintiff gave prompt notice of its decision to arbitrate after learning
of the defendant's waiver."3 9
B. Appeal from an Award
An appeal from an arbitrator's award is to be taken in the same man-
632. Id at 757-58.
633. Id at 758.
634. 414 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1982).
635. Id at 630.
636. 527 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
637. Id at 1142.
638. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d
Cir. 1933).
639. 527 F. Supp. at 1143. The court may have had yet another reason: arbitra-
tion would be the best way of handling the case. The court noted that "this case is
particularly suited for arbitration. All the parties know much more about ade-
quacy of blueprints, sufficiency of electric cable, and the other myriad of technical
subjects involved in this complex lawsuit than I know." Id at 1144.
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ner and to the same extent as from orders of judgment in a civil action. 640
Each state's rules of appellate procedure apply. In Pugar v. Greco,641 the
plaintiff and one of the two defendants filed a motion to appeal, without
payment of additional costs, from a compulsory arbitration award. They
filed the motion within twenty days after the docketing of the award, and it
was denied twenty-one days after the docketing.64" The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed denial of the motion.
643
Then, within twenty days of the supreme court's decision, the parties
paid the additional appellate costs and perfected their appeal from the arbi-
trator's award. A motion was made to quash the appeal as untimely under
the general rule that requesting reconsideration or some other form of relief
does not provide additional time for perfecting an appeal. The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court ruled that the appeal was timely because the
supreme court's opinion denying the motion indicated that the parties
could proceed to perfect their appeal. 644 The court further concluded that
the general rule of not allowing additional time was not applicable since the
appealing parties did not challenge an order of the lower court per se but
instead challenged the appeal procedure itself.6 45 The parties reasonably
believed that by paying the additional costs they would lose their ability to
challenge the constitutionality of the requirement. The motion to appeal
from the arbitrator's award without the payment of additional costs, made
within twenty days of the award, was timely.
646
C. Motion to Vacate or Modify an Award
The timeliness of a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award is
controlled by statute. Under the U.A.A., an application to vacate or mod-
ify must generally be made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of
the award to the applicant.64 7 States adopting the U.A.A. have established
640. U.A.A. § 19(b) (1955).
641. 291 Pa. Super. 476, 436 A.2d 215 (1981).
642. Id at -, 436 A.2d at 219.
643. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 75, 394 A.2d 542, 546 (1978).
644. 291 Pa. Super. at -, 436 A.2d at 219.
645. Id at -, 436 A.2d at 217.
646. Id The dissent in Pugar pointed out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had previously stated that statutes limiting the time under which appeals may be
taken from judicial proceedings are mandatory. The time for appeal is not ex-
tended by post-judgment requests for relief or other proceedings by a party who
thereafter seeks to file an untimely appeal. Id at -, 436 A.2d at 219 (Montgomery,
J., dissenting). See In re Hanna's Estate, 367 Pa. 337, 339, 80 A.2d 740, 741 (1951).
647. U.A.A. §§ 12(b), 13(a) (1955). Section 12, which governs vacation of
awards, provides:
An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated
upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within
ninety days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
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the same basic requirement, but the time periods may vary.
In Downing v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,648 the Michigan Court of Appeals
denied as untimely a motion to vacate an arbitration award.6 49 The award
was issued on April 26. The plaintiff requested clarification of the award on
May 14, and clarification was issued on August 13. On August 24, the
plaintiff asked the arbitrators to reopen the proofs. The court treated this
as a motion to vacate the award.65 ° The Michigan rule provides that an
application to vacate the award must be made within twenty days after
delivery of the award to the applicant. 651 There is no rule requiring clarifi-
cation or reconsideration of an award by arbitrators. Since there was no
statutory authorization for the clarification, it could not toll the twenty-day
limit.65 2 The limit, said the court, was a form of post-trial relief and was
therefore reasonable.
653
The court also found that the time limit did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause because it applies equally to both parties. The court noted
that regardless of another party's attempt to confirm an award, objections
to the award must be made within the twenty day limit.654
In Kress Corp. v. Edw. C Lev Co. ,655 the Illinois Appellate Court af-
firmed an order confirming an award and denying a motion to dismiss the
confirmation application. 65 6 An arbitrator's award notice was mailed on
June 9. On September 17, Kress filed an action to confirm the award.
Levy filed its objections and a motion to dismiss on December 5. Levy's
defenses were thus raised nearly six months after delivery of the notice of
award. 65 7 The Illinois act requires that an application be made within
ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.6 58 The
trial court denied Levy's motion to dismiss and confirmed the award. The
appellate court held that after ninety days a party is barred from asserting
statutory grounds for vacation, regardless of whether the grounds are raised
by independent motion to vacate or in the defense of a motion for confirma-
tion.65 9 In rejecting the federal rule on the subject,6 60 the court stated that
Id. § 12(b). Section 13 provides that the court "shall modify or correct the award"
if required, provided that the application is made within 90 days. Id § 13(b).
648. 113 Mich. App. 96, 317 N.W.2d 302 (1981).
649. Id at 100, 317 N.W.2d at 304.
650. Id at 99, 317 N.W.2d at 304.
651. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 769.9(2) (1963).
652. 113 Mich. App. at 102, 317 N.W.2d at 305.
653. Id at 101, 317 N.W.2d at 305.
654. Id
655. 102 Ill. App. 3d 264, 430 N.E.2d 593 (1981).
656. Id at 270, 430 N.E.2d at 597.
657. Id at 267, 430 N.E.2d at 594.
658. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
659. 102 Ill. App. 3d at 269, 430 N.E.2d at 596.
660. See The Hartbridge, 57 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub nora.
Munson Steamship Line v. North England Steamship Co., 288 U.S. 601 (1933);
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the purpose of the rule is to promote the speedy and final resolution of
disputes between parties and enhance the value of the arbitration
process.
66 1
In McDonaldv. Allstate Insurance Co. ,662 the plaintiff sought confirmation
of the arbitration award against the insurer. The insurer claimed that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers by requiring it to pay more than the pol-
icy limits. The plaintiff insisted that the court was required to confirm the
award unless grounds for vacation or modification were alleged within the
applicable time limit.663 The Florida Supreme Court noted that its arbitra-
tion act provides for a ninety-day time limit 664 but held that the limit does
not apply to nonstatutory defenses such as accord and satisfaction. 665 The
court reasoned that these defenses should be permitted because they are
based on extrinsic circumstances collateral to the arbitration award.6 66
The case of Crutchl v. Crutch1ey667 involved the consent of a husband
and wife to arbitrate the issue of spousal support. An arbitrator's award
was entered and confirmed on December 1, 1977. Neither the arbitrator
nor the confirming court had made findings of fact. On November 30,
1978, the wife moved to modify the award to increase alimony and child
support payments. She alleged that because the arbitrator's award and its
confirmation contained no findings of fact, the award should be modi-
fied.668 The motion was denied and an appeal was taken to the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals two and a half years after entry of the order
confirming the award. North Carolina provides a ninety-day limit for filing
applications for modification. 669 The court held that the appeal was un-
timely and ruled that because the wife did not seek judicial modification
within ninety days after delivery of the award, she had waived her claim
regarding the improper form of the award.6 7 °
In Pessolano v. George R. Price & Associates,671 an arbitration award was
entered in favor of Price. On November 25, the trial court confirmed the
award. On December 15, Pessolano filed motions to set aside the judgment
and to modify and vacate the award. While these motions were pending,
Pessolano filed a notice of appeal on December 17.672 The Georgia Court
Riko Enterprises v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
661. 102 Ill. App. 3d at 269, 430 N.E.2d at 596.
662. 408 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1981).
663. Id at 582.
664. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
665. 408 So. 2d at 582.
666. Id
667. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981).
668. Id at 735-36, 281 S.E.2d at 746.
669. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.14 (Supp. 1979).
670. 53 N.C. App. at 738-39, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
671. 159 Ga. App. 340, 283 S.E.2d 317 (1981).
672. Id at 341, 283 S.E.2d at 318.
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of Appeals held that Pessolano's motions were an attack on the confirma-
tion judgment and as such were the same as a motion for a new trial.67 3
The notice of appeal filed two days after the filing of the motions to vacate
and modify was therefore premature. The court held that since a timely
notice of appeal was required to establish jurisdiction in the appellate court,
the appeal should be dismissed.6 74
While the appeal was pending, the trial court denied Pessolano's mo-
tions on January 30. The appellate court indicated, however, that the sub-
sequent overruling of the motions in the trial court did not perfect a notice
of appeal filed before a final judgment was entered. 75
D. Summary
These recent cases indicate that the timeliness of an appeal or a motion
to vacate or modify an award will be strictly construed in most cases, al-
though an assertion of nonstatutory defenses may be proper even after the
applicable time limit. The issue of whether a demand for arbitration was
made within a reasonable time, not governed by statute, is a question for
the arbitrator, not the courts.
XIII. APPLICABILITY OF THE U.A.A.
The U.A.A. permits parties to lawfully enter into a valid contract for
compulsory arbitration of commercial disputes unless it is specifically pro-
hibited by statute."' The facts of a given case may raise a legal question
regarding the applicability of all or part of the U.A.A.
A. Retroactive Effect
In Evans Electrical Construction Co. v. University of Kansas Medical Center,677
a construction contract between Evans and the state provided that all
claims and disputes arising out of the contract would be submitted to arbi-
tration. As originally passed, the Kansas arbitration act did not specifically
exempt the state and its political subdivisions from its provisions.678 After
the contract was made, and after the dispute arose and suit was brought on
it, the Kansas legislature prohibited compulsory arbitration contracts en-
tered into by the state.6 79 The state could thus lawfully enter into an arbi-
tration provision at the time the contract was formed and the time the case
was filed but not at the time the Kansas Supreme Court received the
673. Id
674. Id
675. Id, 283 S.E.2d at 319.
676. U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
677. 230 Kan. 298, 634 P.2d 1079 (1981).
678. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1975).
679. Id § 75-3741(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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case.68 ° The court was faced with the issue of whether the state exemption
should have retroactive application. The court held that the exemption
should not be applied retroactively because the parties had entered into the
contract with the understanding that they would submit their disputes to
arbitration and that the U.A.A. would apply."I
8
B. Choice of Law
In Kress Corp. v. Edw. C Levy Co. ,682 both parties submitted a written
arbitration agreement to the American Arbitration Association in Chicago.
The agreement did not state whether the U.A.A. or the Federal Arbitration
Act 68 3 should apply. The Illinois Court of Appeals found that in petition-
ing for confirmation and moving to dismiss pursuant to the Illinois version
of the U.A.A., and in bringing the case in an Illinois court, the parties had
impli~dly agreed to submit their dispute to Illinois law. The court applied
the U.A.A.68 4
C. Domestic Relations
In Cm/ch/e v. Crutchley ,685 a husband and wife were involved in a disso-
lution proceeding. Both parties agreed to submit their disputes over child
custody, marital property, and alimony to binding arbitration. The North
Carolina trial court entered an order, which both parties signed, approving
the parties' consent to arbitration and appointing an arbitrator.6 86 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals said that the consent order "was a written
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to arbitrate., 68 7 The
court applied a section of the U.A.A. adopted in North Carolina, which
states that "[t]wo or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitra-
tion any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement,"68 8
and held that the domestic issues were arbitrable.6 89 Since, according to
the court, the arbitration agreement did not contain a written stipulation
that the U.A.A. was inapplicable, the U.A.A. would govern the court's deter-
mination of the validity of the agreement.690
680. 230 Kan. at 304, 634 P.2d at 1079.
681. Id at 305, 634 P.2d at 1084.
682. 102 IM. App. 3d 264, 430 N.E.2d 593 (1981).
683. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
684. 102 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 430 N.E.2d at 595.
685. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981), review granted, 304 N.C. 725, 287
S.E.2d 900 (1982). For further discussion of this area, see Part IV.C.2 supra.
686. 53 N.C. App. at 732, 281 S.E.2d at 744.
687. Id
688. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) (Supp. 1979). Cf U.A.A. § 1 (1955).
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XIV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.A.A.
Various provisions of the U.A.A. have withstood constitutional chal-
lenges in several jurisdictions. These challenges have raised several issues,
none of which has been successful. The party challenging the constitution-
ality of any section of the U.A.A. has the burden of proving the constitu-
tional violation, and this burden of proof has proved difficult to satisfy.69 '
If the statute can be construed in a manner consistent with the Constitu-
tion, the court will uphold it. 9 2 The U.A.A. contains the usual provision
that protects the act in its entirety from being held unconstitutional. 9 3
Section 1 of the U.A.A. governs the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment.694 By signing such an agreement, a party relinquishes his constitu-
tional right to a trial before a court of law.693  Michigan courts have
unanimously agreed that this aspect of the U.A.A., as embodied in the
state's Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act, 696 is not unconstitutional.
9 7
Although a party may waive his right to a trial by entering into an arbitra-
tion agreement, Michigan has held that such a waiver must be knowing and
voluntary.
698
691. See, e.g., Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 115, 309 N.W.2d 910,
913 (1981); Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 97, 309 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1981).
692. Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 97, 309 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1981).
693. U.A.A. § 22 (1955) provides:
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions
or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are
severable.
694. Id § 1.
695. Rome v. Sinai Hospital, 112 Mich. App. 387, 390, 316 N.W.2d 428, 429
(1982); DiPonio v. Henry Ford Hospital, 109 Mich. App. 243, 250, 311 N.W.2d 754,
757 (1981).
696. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-
1983).
697. Although Michigan courts agree that waiver of the right of access to the
courts by entering into an agreement with a hospital or doctor to arbitrate all
claims is not unconstitutional, they are sharply divided as to whether the inclusion
of a physician on the three-member arbitration board violates the patient's due
process rights to an impartial hearing. See Part XV infra.
698. Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 114, 309 N.W.2d 910, 911
(1981); Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 106, 309 N.W.2d 575, 590 (1981). The
knowing and voluntary waiver standard is also responsible for the divided opinions
of Michigan courts as to the validity of medical malpractice agreements. The arbi-
tration agreement form mandated for use by the Michigan statute does not inform
the patient that one member of the board will be a physician. That information is
included in an accompanying booklet that the patient is not required to read. Two
Michigan decisions, therefore, clearly indicate that signing the arbitration agree-
ment does not, without more, constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
patient's right to trial. Jackson v. Detroit Memorial Hospital, 110 Mich. App. 202,
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The provisions of various state arbitration statutes relating to time lim-
its for applications to vacate arbitration awards have been attacked as vio-
lations of due process in that the periods are so short that they effectively
bar judicial relief.69 9 Challenges have recently been made to Maryland's
thirty day70 0 and Michigan's twenty day701 time periods. Both were upheld
as constitutional.70 2 The U.A.A. statutory time limit for filing an applica-
tion to vacate an arbitration award is ninety days. 0 3 Since this is a consid-
erably longer period than those provided by Maryland and Michigan, it is
likely that it too will withstand constitutional challenge.
To date, no constitutional attack on the U.A.A. itself has been success-
ful. Constitutional challenges to some state provisions which, though
modeled after the U.A.A., are more restrictive have been similarly unsuc-
cessful. State arbitration statutes that omit specific provisions of the U.A.A.
have been called into question but have also been upheld as constitutional.
In Morris v. Metryakool 0 and Brown v. Siang,7 ° 5 the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals considered the Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act.7"6
The courts pointed out that, unlike section 9 of the U.A.A. which allows
appeals from arbitral awards, 70 7 the Medical Malpractice statute severely
limited a party's right to appeal from an award.708 However, the decisions
upheld the statute, emphasizing (1) the voluntary nature of the arbitration
agreement, and (2) the Michigan constitution, which does not extend the
right to appeal even in civil litigation.
70 9
205, 312 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1981); Williams v. O'Connor, 108 Mich. App. 613, 620-
21, 310 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1981).
699. Delcostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721, 725 (D.
Md. 1981); Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Mich. App. 96, 101, 317 N.W.2d 302,
305 (1982).
700. Delcostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721, 725 (D.
Md. 1981).
701. Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Mich. App. 96, 100, 317 N.W.2d 302, 304
(1982).
702. Delcostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721, 725 (D.
Md. 1981); Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Mich. App. 96, 101, 317 N.W.2d 302,
305 (1982).
703. U.A.A. § 12(b) (1955).
704. 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981).
705. 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981).
706. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-
1983).
707. U.A.A. § 9 (1955).
708. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3056 (West Gum. Supp. 1982-1983).
709. Mois, 107 Mich. App. at 135, 309 N.W.2d at 920; Brown, 107 Mich. App.
at 103, 309 N.W.2d at 580. For further discussion of the constitutionality of the
Michigan Medical Malpractice Act, see Part XV.A infra.
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XV. ARBITRATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Although the U.A.A. is broad enough to include medical malpractice
claims, 710 several states that have adopted it have amended their versions to
specifically exclude such claims from its coverage.7 1' Other states have im-
posed the requirement that claims be reviewed by a malpractice screening




In contrast, several states that adopted the U.A.A. amended their ver-
sions to specifically provide for the arbitration of medical malpractice
claims.7 13 Michigan is one such state, and it has already developed a signifi-
cant body of law-much of it inconsistent-on the issue. In 1975, the state
legislature enacted the R. Hood-McNeely-Geake Malpractice Act, 1 a leg-
islative attempt to combat spiralling health care costs caused by increased
malpractice litigation. 7 5 The Malpractice Act establishes a procedure
under which any individual may voluntarily agree to submit to arbitration
any claim arising from treatment or care that he may later assert against a
health care provider or hospital.7 1 It provides standards against which ar-
bitration agreements are to be measured and creates mandatory procedures
that control the arbitration process.
717
710. See U.A.A. § 1 (1955) ("any existing controversy").
711. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Cum. Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
48-10 (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1982); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
712. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1004 (1979);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN, LAws ANN.
ch. 231, § 60B (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
713. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.55.535-.560 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10,
§§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
714. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-
1983).
715. Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 97-98, 309 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1981).
716. The statute applies to:
arbitration of a dispute, controversy, or issue arising out of or resulting
from injury to, or the death of, a person caused by an error, omission, or
negligence in the performance of professional services by a health care
provider, hospital, or their agent, or based on a claimed performance of
such services without consent, in breach of warranty, or in violation of
contract.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5040 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). A health care
provider is defined as a "person, partnership, or corporation lawfully engaged in the
practice of medicine, surgery, dentistry, podiatry, optometry, chiropractic, nursing,
or a person dispensing drugs or medicines." Id A hospital is defined as a "person,
partnership, or corporation lawfully engaged in the operation of a hospital, clinic,
health maintenance organization, or a sanitarium." Id
717. Id §§ 600.5041-.5042.
[Vol. 48
78
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/11
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
The arbitration agreement offered to a patient must state that execu-
tion of the agreement is not a prerequisite to care or treatment and that the
patient may revoke the agreement by notifying the doctor within sixty days
after execution of the agreement or notifying the hospital within sixty days
after discharge.7"' At the time the agreement is signed, the patient must be
given a booklet that clearly explains the agreement and the revocation pro-
cedure.719 The Malpractice Act requires that all claims go to an arbitration
panel made up of one physician or hospital administrator,7'2 0 one lawyer,
and one other person who cannot be a lawyer, physician, hospital represen-
tative, or insurance agent.7 M If the arbitration agreement conforms to the
statute, is properly executed by the patient, and is not revoked within the
sixty-day period, the claim must go to arbitration.
722
A. Constitutionality
Several recent cases have tested the constitutionality of the Michigan
act and have come to different conclusions. In Brown v. Siang,72' a doctor
performed a liver biopsy on the plaintiff's decedent. The plaintiff filed a
malpractice suit against the hospital. The hospital moved to submit the
dispute to arbitration based on the agreement signed by the decedent
718. Id §§ 600.5048-.5052.
719. Id § 600.5041.
720. The physician panelist is preferably, but not necessarily, from the medical
specialty involved in the claim unless the claim involves a health care provider
other than a physician; in that case a licensee of the health profession involved may
be substituted for a physician. Id § 600.5044.
721. Id The panel is normally selected by the parties from a list prepared by the
American Arbitration Association. By agreement of all the parties, however, an
unlisted panelist for one of the designated categories may serve at the hearing. If
the parties cannot select a panel by mutual agreement, the Association must ap-
point the remainder of the panel. An appointed arbitrator may be challenged for
cause by any party. "Cause" means a challenge which alleges facts establishing
that "unusual community or professional pressures will unreasonably influence the
objectivity of the panelist." Id Parties at the hearing may be represented by coun-
sel, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. The prevailing standard of duty,
practice, or care applicable in a civil action is used at the hearing, and damages or
other remedies are not limited except by other applicable laws. Id § 600.5043. The
procedures to be followed at the hearing, as well as the rules of evidence and discov-
ery, are thoroughly detailed. Id §§ 600.5048-.5052. A majority of the panel has the
power to grant "any relief deemed just, including money damages, provision for
hospitalization, medical or rehabilitative procedures, support, or any combination
thereof." Id § 600.5054. An appeal from an arbitration award must qualify under
the general arbitration statute and the applicable court rules. Id § 600.5067. The
Malpractice Act governs conflicts arising between its sections and those of the gen-
eral arbitration statute. Id § 600.5058.
722. Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 98, 309 N.W.2d 575, 578 (1981).
723. 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981).
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before his operation. The trial court granted the motion."'
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Malpractice Act failed to en-
sure an impartial tribunal by requiring that a physician or hospital admin-
istrator be on the panel and therefore violated due process. 725 The
Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that (1) no one arbitrator
can control a decision under the Malpractice Act, (2) policy considerations
support the presence of an expert on the panel, and (3) all of the arbitrators
must be screened for bias under the statute. 726 The plaintiff next argued
that the decedent did not knowingly waive her right to trial. The court
stated that the agreement was voluntarily signed by the decedent, and it
contained a clear explanation of its effect as a waiver.727 The court also
rejected an argument that the arbitration agreement was an adhesion con-
tract, noting that the agreement was not a prerequisite to care, the patient
had sixty days to revoke it, and the patient received a booklet explaining
the agreement and the revocation procedure at the time the contract was
executed.728
The same three issues came before another panel of the Michigan
Court of Appeals in Morris v. Metrtiakool,729 a case decided the same day as
Brown. The majority in Morris reached the same result as the Brown court
but added that "whether the system will be workable remains to be
seen."' 0 The dissent believed that the composition of the arbitration panel
was unconstitutional. A litigant, it noted, does not have to prove actual
prejudice on the part of a tribunal, only that the risk of bias is "too
great.",73 ' The dissent argued that a substantial number of physicians are
biased against malpractice plaintiffs, and, therefore, a physician on the ar-
bitration panel often will be prejudiced.73 2 The dissent would have invali-
dated the entire Malpractice Act because of that provision, arguing that the
legislature would not have passed the Act without requiring that a health
care provider be a member of the panel and thus that provision was not
severable. 7
33
The dissent's arguments in Morris were reflected in Jackson v. Detroit Me-
morial Hospital,3 in which the Malpractice Act was declared unconstitu-
tional by a unanimous panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals. The
plaintiff inJackson, after signing an arbitration agreement, was treated by a
724. Id at 95, 309 N.W.2d at 576.
725. Id at 99, 309 N.W.2d at 578.
726. Id at 103-04, 309 N.W.2d at 580-81.
727. Id at 104-06, 309 N.W.2d at 581.
728. Id at 108, 309 N.W.2d at 582.
729. 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981).
730. Id at 120, 309 N.W.2d at 913.
731. Id at 122, 309 N.W.2d at 914 (Bronson, J., concurring and dissenting),
732. Id at 128, 309 N.W.2d at 917 (Bronson, J., concurring and dissenting).
733. Id at 134-35, 309 N.W.2d at 920 (Bronson, J., concurring and dissenting).
734. 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212 (1981).
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dentist at a hospital. She did not revoke the agreement within the time
provided, but she filed a civil suit rather than submit her claim to arbitra-
tion. The court rejected her argument that the agreement was an adhesion
contract.735 But, unlike the Brown and Morris courts, this court held that
the Malpractice Act was unconstitutional because it required a panel of
arbitrators so composed that "the probability of actual bias on the part of
the . . decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." 73 6 The
court noted that the failure of the Malpractice Act to provide a mechanism
for relief from arbitration after the sixty-day revocation period when the
patient did not know about the panel's composition was an important fac-
tor in its decision.
73 7
The constitutional waters were further muddied by the decision in
Cushman v. Frankel.73 Cushman, though decided afterJackson, chose to fol-
low Brown instead.73 9 This panel of the court of appeals reasoned that the
procedures in the Malpractice Act to prevent panel bias were sufficient to
protect claimants. The court said, "To conclude otherwise would imply an
inherent prejudice within the medical professions so deeply held as to pre-
clude members from ever standing in judgment of their colleagues.'" 7 40
B. Revocation Period
While the constitutionality of the arbitration panel has not yet been
settled, recent litigation has clarified the construction of some ambiguous
terms in the Malpractice Act.
In DiPonio v. Henry Ford Hospital,74 ' the plaintiffs' decedent died during
a heart operation after executing an arbitration agreement. Shortly there-
after, the plaintiffs requested copies of all of the decedent's hospital records.
No copy of the arbitration agreement was given to the plaintiffs. Eleven
months after the death, the plaintiffs filed a malpractice suit against the
hospital. The hospital moved to compel arbitration based on the agree-
ment. The plaintiffs argued that they had no knowledge of the agreement
until the hospital filed its motion. The trial court denied the motion, giving
the plaintiffs sixty days from the date of discovery to revoke it. The plain-
tiffs revoked the agreement.74 -
The question on appeal was whether the agreement was revoked in a
735. Id at 205-06, 312 N.W.2d at 214.
736. Id at 204, 312 N.W.2d at 213 (quoting Crampton v. Department of State,
395 Mich. 347, 356, 235 N.W.2d 352, 356 (1975)).
737. 110 Mich. App. at 205, 312 N.W.2d at 214. The defendants were granted
leave to appeal on December 1, 1981, but the Michigan Supreme Court had not
decided the case at the time of this publication.
738. 111 Mich. App. 604, 314 N.W.2d 705 (1981).
739. Id at 608-09, 314 N.W.2d at 707.
740. Id at 610, 314 N.W.2d at 708.
741. 109 Mich. App. 243, 311 N.W.2d 754 (1981).
742. Id at 245-46, 311 N.W.2d at 755.
1983]
81
et al.: Uniform Arbitration Ac
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
timely fashion. The Malpractice Act provides that a person receiving care
from a hospital may revoke within sixty days after his discharge. 743 The
Mi~higan Court of Appeals held that when a patient dies in a hospital the
sixty-day period does not begin running until a personal representative of
the decedent is appointed, if the representative was aware of the agreement
when appointed, or until the representative learns or should have learned of
the agreement, if he was unaware of the agreement.74 " The court reasoned
that prior court decisions had recognized that the revocation period should
be tolled when a patient is mentally or physically unable to communicate
his revocation or authorize his legal representative to do so. 745 The dece-
dent's death put him in that category of patients until his personal represen-
tative discovered the existence of the agreement. The court therefore ruled
that the plaintiffs had timely revoked the agreement.74 6
A similar issue was raised in Boiko v. Heny Ford Hospital,74 7 but a varia-
tion in facts led to a different result. The facts in Boiko were similar to those
in DiPonio, except that the plaintiff did not argue lack of knowledge of the
agreement. The trial court had held the agreement unenforceable, reason-
ing that the agreement never came into effect because the decedent was
never "discharged" from the hospital as required by the statute.748 On ap-
peal, the court found that the Malpractice Act was intended to cover dis-
putes involving the death of a patient.74 9 Since the plaintiff knew of the
agreement, the sixty-day period began to run when he was appointed.
Since he did not revoke it, the arbitration agreement was binding.
750
C. Parties Bound by the Agr. ement
In Brown v. Considine T7i a different issue was presented for review. The
plaintiff and her husband filed a malpractice suit against a hospital and a
doctor. The plaintiff had executed an arbitration agreement with the hos-
pital before treatment, but the doctor did not sign an agreement to submit
to arbitration until after the treatment was completed. The plaintiff con-
tended that the doctor was not included in the arbitration agreement, even
if the agreement with the hospital was valid.752 The Michigan Court of
Appeals held that the agreement with the hospital did not extend to the
doctor. The court construed the Malpractice Act to exclude past acts of
743. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041-.5042 (West Gum. Supp. 1982-
1983).
744. 109 Mich. App. at 253, 311 N.W.2d at 758.
745. Id at 252-53, 311 N.W.2d at 758.
746. Id at 253, 311 N.W.2d at 758.
747. 110 Mich. App. 514, 313 N.W.2d 344 (1981).
748. Id at 516, 313 N.W.2d at 345.
749. Id at 517-18, 313 N.W.2d at 345.
750. Id at 520-21, 313 N.W.2d at 347.
751. 108 Mich. App. 504, 310 N.W.2d 441 (1981).
752. Id at 505-07, 310 N.W.2d at 442-43.
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In Bowes v. International Pharmakon Laboratories,754 the Michigan Court of
Appeals faced the issue of whether procedural rules relating to the joinder
of parties may expand the jurisdiction of a circuit court to join, as a part, to
a malpractice suit, a person who has signed an arbitration agreement with
the opposing party. The plaintiff in Bowes contracted meningitis, which she
claimed was caused by a contaminant in an antiseptic applied to her skin
by a doctor. She initially sued the manufacturer on a products liability
theory but later added the doctor as a party defendant. The plaintiff had
signed an arbitration agreement with the doctor but not with the other
defendants. The doctor moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court
denied his request.7 55
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court's order was proper
because the joinder of parties rule allowed the joining of the doctor to the
civil action.75 6 The court held that the lower court should have compelled
arbitration, reasoning that the Malpractice Act restricts subject matter ju-
risdiction over malpractice claims to an arbitration panel once a valid
agreement exists. 75 7 Consequently, the joinder rules normally applicable in
courts of original jurisdiction are not applicable.75
753. Id at 508, 310 N.W.2d at 443-44.
754. 111 Mich. App. 410, 314 N.W.2d 642 (1981).
755. Id at 412, 314 N.W.2d at 642.
756. Id at 411-12, 314 N.W.2d at 643.
757. Id at 417, 314 N.W.2d at 644-45.
758. Id at 413-15, 314 N.W.2d at 644.
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